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How can the United States prevail in a limited war with China or Russia that could escalate to the 
use of nuclear weapons? In other words, how can the United States favorably manage escalation in a 
conflict with China or Russia while achieving its political objectives? This problem is becoming 
increasingly important both in the Western Pacific due to the growth of China’s conventional 
military capabilities and the concurrent modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and in Eastern Europe 
because of the limited but significant reinvigoration of Russia’s non-nuclear military forces and its 
retention of a formidable, diversified nuclear force.  
 
Together, these developments mean that the United States can no longer confidently expect to so 
readily handle and contain a Chinese challenge to U.S. interests, allies, or partners in maritime Asia 
as it has in the past, or a Russian one in Eastern NATO. Both China and Russia will increasingly 
have the ability to effectively contest U.S. interests in these important regions, and will be able to do 
so in ways that will intensify pressures towards escalation of the conflict and make it much harder to 
control – including not only at the conventional but also at the nuclear levels of warfare. Thus, if the 
United States wishes to be able to defend its interests in these regions – at least as traditionally 
conceived – it will therefore need to adapt to these evolving challenges, in particular by figuring out 
how both to prevail in its political-military objectives and set and exploit the boundaries of escalation 
in ways that will allow it to do so that correlate its interests with the risks it assumes.  
 
This problem is of near-term, practical significance for the United States. In Asia, China’s 
conventional military capabilities in the Western Pacific are improving and expanding at a substantial 
rate, even as U.S. military capability in the region is under considerable pressure due to a 
combination of factors, including competing demands for U.S. military resources and tightened 
budgets. This is evening the conventional balance in the region in ways that will make escalation 
control more difficult for the United States.1 Concurrently, China is modernizing its nuclear arsenal 
in ways that will give it greater capacity for flexible use in a fashion that will challenge traditional 
U.S. advantages in the discriminate employment of nuclear forces.2 In terms of intentions, Chinese 
actions in the East and South China Seas strongly suggest that it will be prepared to use its 
improving capabilities to advance its interests in maritime Asia. At the same time, the United States 
has made clear that it intends to retain its leading position in the region, and has reassured U.S. allies 
and partners of this intention – and of the ultimate commitment of the United States to use nuclear 
weapons to defend U.S. allies.   
 
A cognate, though different, geopolitical and military dynamic holds in Eastern Europe. There, 
Russia has reinvigorated its conventional forces, building a modernized non-nuclear joint force with 
potent offensive capabilities, one particularly capable within Moscow’s near abroad and for a 
                                       
1 For a near-definitive statement of this sobering reality, see specifically “Chapter Thirteen: The Receding Frontier of 
U.S. Dominance,” in Eric Higenbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, 
Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David Fr. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, 
Lyle J. Morris. The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1997-2017 (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), http://www.rand/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf 
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China 2016 (2016), 38, 57-59, 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf 
d.org/content/dam/rand 









relatively limited period of time. Moscow has also developed a sophisticated set of unconventional 
capabilities – including the paradigmatic “little green men” – useful for shaping international 
perceptions in ways favorable to the Kremlin. Finally, Russia has retained and is updating its large 
and variegated nuclear arsenal, one possessed of substantial potency as well as flexibility. Together, 
these efforts have yielded a situation in which an increasingly assertive Moscow, which appears keen 
to reestablish its primacy in its traditional areas of influence and to weaken or even break NATO as 
a meaningful alliance, has significant local and temporary advantages over the Alliance, especially in 
the Baltics and possibly other areas of Eastern Europe. This presents a situation in which there is a 
danger that Russia could execute a fait accompli or coup de main strategy against NATO using its local 
advantages and then “escalate to deescalate” against the Alliance using its strategic capabilities in the 
hope of cowing it into concession. Meanwhile, the United States remains as committed as ever to 
the security of NATO.  
 
The United States therefore needs to adapt to a situation to which it has become unfamiliar over the 
last generation – that is, it will need to be ready to fight and prevail in a war over issues the United 
States regards as of great but still not the most vital importance against a highly capable, nuclear-
armed opponent. This means that it must be able to fight a war that has meaningful limits. Yet, 
unlike during the post-Cold War period, the United States will no longer enjoy so much discretion in 
setting the parameters for limitation. The United States must therefore find ways to limit war against 
China or Russia – but doing so will be much harder than it has been since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
While this exceedingly difficult strategic problem received a great deal of attention during the Cold 
War, when it was judged that the Soviet Union enjoyed conventional military superiority in Europe, 
it has received very little attention since then, either in the Department of Defense or in the 
analytical and academic worlds. In particular, while an increasing amount of quality analysis is being 
directed towards the problems of limiting war and escalation management in the South Asia and 
North Korean contexts, very little has gone towards the challenges of how the United States could 
effectively limit and prevail in a conflict with a highly capable adversary possessed of survivable 
nuclear forces like China or Russia. This presents a danger to the United States because it leaves the 
U.S. military unprepared for the paradigmatic “next war,” thereby raising the risk that this lacuna will 
be exploited, decreasing the effectiveness and credibility of the nation’s deterrent posture, and 
endangering U.S. interests and forces in the event of such a conflict breaking out.  
 
The ambition of this study is not to lay out a proposed plan or plans for how the United States and 
its allies can achieve this, since that is beyond its scope and competence. Rather, its purpose is to 
develop a logic from which to develop and evaluate the potential plans and strategies designed to 
meet this challenge as well as the broader policy implications that flow from preparing to effectively 
conduct a limited war.  
 
This is important because building effective war plans and developing accompanying policies for 
limited conflict requires an understanding of the logic of how both to conduct a limited war and 
prevail within it. 
 









This study should equally be of interest to policy analysts and scholars increasingly seized by the 
importance of this challenge. Just as officials inside the U.S. Government will be tasked with 
developing strategies to deal with this growing problem, so independent scholars and analysts will 
want and should seek to evaluate these efforts.  
 
 
Accordingly, this study seeks to address this gap by describing the nature of the problem the United 
States and its allies face and elucidating the kind of approach required to conduct and prevail in such 
a conflict. Based on this approach, strategists, planners, and crisis managers can adapt particular war 
plans, military and deterrent postures, and crisis management or conflict resolution measures to 
leverage the most appropriate strategies and mechanisms for limitation to particular plausible 
contingencies, and scholars and independent analysts can evaluate these efforts and seek to refine 
and improve the way we think about the problem.  
  









THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AND EASTERN EUROPE AND 
THE CONSEQUENT NEED FOR A LIMITED WAR STRATEGY    
 
Western Pacific – China  
 
The United States seeks a cooperative and constructive relationship with the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Yet tensions persist between the two nations, and indeed in some respects this friction 
has been intensifying in recent years.3 These tensions stem from the reality that the United States 
and China have different, often competing, and sometimes conflicting interests. The reality and 
depth of these disagreements mean that the United States needs to be prepared for conflict with the 
PRC, as it has sought to be for many decades.4  
 
Most immediately, Asia is host to a number of potential flashpoints connected to longstanding 
disputes reflecting deep divergences of perspective between Washington and Beijing on contentious 
strategic issues.5 The two nations do not see eye to eye on the appropriate way to resolve the status 
of Taiwan, on how to adjudicate Beijing’s territorial disputes with a variety of countries in the East 
and South China Seas, and on how to deal with an abidingly belligerent North Korea. Accordingly, it 
has long been accepted in defense circles that the United States and the PRC could come into 
conflict over these longstanding flashpoints. For instance, the United States and the PRC might 
come to blows in the event Beijing sought to coerce Taiwan into political union with the mainland, 
if China used military force against U.S. allies such as Japan or the Philippines over islets in the East 
or South China Seas, or in the event of war or chaos on the Korean Peninsula. While these 
flashpoints need not and hopefully will not lead to conflict, it is widely accepted that they might since 
they implicate interests that both sides regard as important and even “core,” to use the Chinese 
phraseology.6  
 
More broadly, however, it appears reasonable to expect that new areas of friction between the 
United States and the PRC could well and in fact are probably likely to develop as China rises. This 
stems fundamentally from the principle that China’s conception of its interests is likely to expand as 
it grows wealthier and more powerful.7 As China’s national power and, in particular, its military 
                                       
3 For an overview of these tensions, see, Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2012). 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieb
erthal.pdf. 
4 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2011), 97-98.    
5 For a measured and incisive discussion of potential flashpoints and the potential for Sino-U.S. conflict, see the remarks 
of Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Nikkei Conference in May 2014.  “Speech by Prime Minister Lee 




6 See PRC discussion of “core interests” Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: On ‘Core 
Interests,’” China Leadership Monitor No. 34 (Stanford University: Hoover Institution, Winter 2011), 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM34MS.pdf. 
7 This is a staple of international relations theory. It is worth observing in this regard, for instance, that the current 
serious tensions implicating Chinese territorial claims in the East and South China Seas were not widely anticipated even 









strength grow, so too will its ability to use that power – including, particularly, military power – to 
reasonably aspire towards and pursue broader goals. In the past, while Washington and Beijing had 
serious differences of view regarding issues such as Taiwan, there was little Beijing could do 
militarily in maritime Asia. It simply lacked the ability to project power effectively. But China’s 
growing strength, wealth, and particularly its military power mean that it has gained and will 
continue to gain a greater ability to do so, initially in the Western Pacific and subsequently beyond. 
Nor is this merely speculative; we can already observe evidence of an increased Chinese willingness 
to use coercion and even force to advance its interests in the South and East China Seas as it has 
grown stronger.8 
 
At the most general level, the United States and China are increasingly enwrapped in the difficult 
dynamics associated with the interactions between a rising and an established power, especially an 
established power with firm alliance relationships with other regional states, many of which 
themselves have difficult relations with Beijing. The United States is the established primate power 
in maritime Asia and seeks to maintain a leading position there, both for its own sake and to defend 
and vindicate the interests of allies and other partner states. It is widely observed, on the other hand, 
that China appears to be aiming to rival and possibly supplant the United States in this role and even 
to establish a degree of dominance over the region.9 This dynamic has only intensified since the 
accession of Xi Jinping to power, but appears to reflect a broader trend in Chinese behavior on the 
international scene.10  
 
The combination, therefore, of persisting disagreements between Washington and Beijing, including 
ones that implicate U.S. allies, and a growing Chinese capability to employ military force effectively 
in the region means that it is highly likely that tensions and friction will continue to characterize their 
relationship – and thus that conflict will remain possible. The United States must therefore take 
serious account of the possibility of war with China breaking out.  
 
                                                                                                                           
ten years ago, well within the horizon of defense procurement and planning. See, for instance, the total omission of 
lingering territorial disputes in Pacific Command Commander’s posture statements as recently as 2009. CNAS is 
currently conducting a year-long study on the likely character of Chinese foreign and defense policy and posture once 
the PRC fields a globally-deploying People’s Liberation Army sometime after 2025. Insights and results from this 
research would be folded into the proposed PASCC study. For an example of U.S. Pacific Command posture 
statements, see “Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Senate 
Armed Services Committee: U.S. Pacific Commander Posture,” Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
U.S. Senate, March 19, 2009, http://www.alu.army.mil/ALU_INTERNAT/CountryNotes/ 
PACOM/2.PACOM%20Posture%20Statement.pdf. 
8 See, for instance, Patrick M. Cronin, Dr. Ely Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Zachary M. Hosford and Alexander Sullivan, 
“Tailored Coercion: Competition and Risk in Maritime Asia,” (Center for a New American Security, March 2014), 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_TailoredCoercion_report.pdf. 
9 See, for instance, “Face-off,” The Economist, November 30, 2013, in which the influential journal judged “China is eager 
to re-establish dominance over the region [East Asia].” Available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590930-chinas-new-air-defence-zone-suggests-worrying-new-approach-
region-face. 
10 For an in-depth discussion of China’s increasing willingness and ability to exert influence internationally, see Dr. Ely 
Ratner, Elbridge Colby, Andrew Erickson, Zachary Hosford, and Alexander Sullivan, “More Willing and Able: Charting 
China’s International Security Activism,” (Center for a New American Security, May 2015), 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_TailoredCoercion_report.pdf.   









Eastern Europe – Russia  
 
At the same time, the United States also faces a considerably more serious challenge militarily and 
thus geopolitically in Europe.11 At the broadest level, there is markedly increased tension between 
Moscow on the one hand and many of its neighbors and those allied to them, including Washington, 
on the other over a range of political, economic, and military issues in Eastern Europe. This is 
leading to an increased fear of war in the region, including involving NATO members, and appears 
likely to be a persisting reality for the foreseeable future.12  
 
On the one side, Russia’s seizure of Crimea, its incursions into and support for separatist forces in 
Ukraine, and its increasingly bellicose rhetoric and menacing behavior regarding its former 
possessions to the west and south have persuaded many in the region and beyond that Moscow is 
prepared to employ force to pursue its strategic objectives, one of which many believe to be 
regaining ascendancy, if not hegemony, in its historical near abroad.13 Countries such as the Baltic 
states, Poland, and Romania in NATO (and therefore beneficiaries of American extended 
deterrence) and Georgia and Ukraine outside of it, are thus concerned that they could become the 
victims of Russian military assault (or, in the case of Ukraine and Georgia, further assault). Indeed, 
many in these countries already regard themselves as being under at the least harassment and, to 
some, a form of political attack by Moscow.  
 
Meanwhile, the Kremlin appears to be convinced that the West is out to emasculate Russia and 
make it a supine satellite. Moscow views as threatening and hostile steps viewed as legitimate and 
peaceful by the West, such as the integration of former Soviet republics into European and 
transatlantic politico-economic and security institutions such as the European Union and NATO 
and the promotion of political reform and democratization throughout the region.14 Moscow 
                                       
11 This section is partially drawn from previous work by the author. For an analysis of the role Russia’s nuclear forces 
could play in a NATO-Russia conflict, see author’s “Countering Russian Nuclear Strategy in Central Europe,” in  
“Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe: U.S.-Central Europe Strategic Assessment Group Report,” 
(Center for European Policy Analysis, November 2015), http://cepa.org/files/?id_plik=2102.  For a discussion of how 
Russia views its nuclear force posture as part of its strategy to regain its former dominance see the author’s “Russia’s 
evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications,” note n. 01/2016, (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 12 January 
2016), https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/web/documents/2016/201601.pdf. 
12 For a somewhat exaggerated but illuminating assessment, see Max Fisher, “How World War III Became Possible: A 
Nuclear Conflict with Russia is Likelier than You Think,” Vox, June 29, 2015, available at 
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war.  
13 For a similar analysis, see Robert M. Gates, “Putin’s Challenge to the West,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014. 
The sources of Russian strategic thinking and doctrine are the subject of extensive debate, and analysts differ as to what 
drives Moscow’s strategy. Factors identified include: resentment at Russia’s lessened sway and prestige in its former 
empire and beyond and a consequent desire to recover them, insecurity in the face of NATO expansion and the Alliance 
and the United States’ use of force outside of what Moscow sees as legitimate channels, deeply-embedded cultural and 
organizational inclinations, simple paranoia, and other factors. For a more extensive analysis of Russia – and particularly 
Vladimir Putin’s – foreign policy drivers, see Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield for the Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).    
14 See, for instance, Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” The Kremlin, Moscow, March 
18, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889. See also the Kommersant interview with Nikolai Patrushev, head of the 
Russian security council, who identified color revolutions, along with terrorism, as the foremost threat to Russia and 
asserted that the United States “would rather than Russia did not exist at all. As a country.” Nikolai Patrushev and Elena 









therefore seems increasingly ready to fight to secure what it judges to be its rights and prerogatives, 
some of which Moscow evidently sees as extending beyond its recognized borders. For instance, 
Moscow has pledged that it will protect ethnic Russians or Russian speakers beyond the borders of 
the Russian Federation.15   
 
Indeed, it seems fair to assess that the current (and most likely for the near future) leadership in 
Russia wishes to regain some degree of the suzerainty it enjoyed before the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire. Moscow sees NATO expansion as well as the growth of the European Union into areas it 
judges as falling within its sphere of influence as jeopardizing this objective. Setting aside whether 
such ambitions and fears are justified or not, it seems fair to characterize Russia as a clearly 
revanchist power, unsatisfied with the current political-strategic status quo in its near abroad.16     
 
Especially in the last several years and with increasing intensity since the beginning of the Ukraine 
crisis, Moscow sees the United States and NATO as the leading threats to this conception of its 
interests and security.17 Indeed, in its late 2014 revision to its military doctrine, Moscow labeled the 
Alliance as the chief danger to Russian security.18 The Kremlin, impressed in particular by American 
military prowess, has noted the willingness of the United States and NATO to use military force 
                                                                                                                           
Chernenko, “Terrorism, Ukraine and the American threat: the view from Russia,” The Guardian, July 15, 2015, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/russia-terrorism-ukraine-america-putin.    
15 See, for instance, Robert Coalson, “Russia Pledges to Protect All Ethnic Russians Anywhere. So, Where Are They?” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 10, 2014, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ethnic-russification-
baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html.    
16 For a clear recent statement of Russia’s view of NATO as a hostile force and the Kremlin’s general dissatisfaction with 
the existing regional and international political orders, see The Kremlin, “National Security Strategy,” available at 
http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf, with an English 
translation available at BBC Monitoring, January 7, 2016, sections 15-18 and 106. For preliminary analyses of the 
document, see Olga Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy,” CSIS.org, January 7, 2016, available at 
http://csis.org/publication/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy, and Mark Galeotti, “Russia’s New 
National Security Strategy: Familiar Themes, Gaudy Rhetoric,” War on the Rocks, January 4, 2016, available at 
http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/russias-new-national-security-strategy-familiar-themes-gaudy-rhetoric/. 
17 China appears to occupy a secondary place in Moscow’s hierarchy of threats, especially in light of the recent 
confrontation with the West over Ukraine and Crimea. For a discussion of China’s place in Russian security thinking, see 
Simon Saradzhyan, “The Role of China in Russia’s Military Thinking,” International Relations and Security Network, May 4, 
2010, available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20129/role_of_china_in_russias_military_thinking.html. Indeed, if 
anything, Russia appears to be seeking to deepen security cooperation with China, though it is likely that structural and 
historical-cultural tensions will continue to place limits on the depth of such engagement. For recent reporting on Sino-
Russian collaboration, see Sam LaGrone, “Largest Chinese, Russian Joint Pacific Naval Exercise Kicks Off This Week,” 
USNI News, August 17, 2015, available at http://news.usni.org/2015/08/17/largest-china-russia-pacific-naval-exercise-
kicks-off-this-week; “Russia to Launch Large-Scale Space Projects With China,” Sputnik, June 30, 2015, available at 
http://in.sputniknews.com/russia/20150630/1014976280.html; and “China supports Russia’s actions in Syria — 
foreign ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, December 4, 2015, available at http://tass.ru/en/world/841546.. 
18 Carol J. Williams, “Russia Revises Military Doctrine to Name NATO as Chief Threat,” The Los Angeles Times, 
December 26, 2015, available at http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-military-doctrine-nato-20141226-
story.html. The Commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, has gone so far as to assert that the 
Kremlin wants to “destroy NATO” by “splintering it.” Justin Huggler, “Putin Wants to Destroy NATO, Says US 
Commander in Europe Ben Hodges,” The Guardian, March 4, 2015, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11448971/Vladimir-Putin-wants-to-destroy-Nato-says-
US-commander-in-Europe-Ben-Hodges.html. 









outside channels Moscow deems legitimate (such as the United Nations Security Council), including 
in areas of special interest to Russia, such as Serbia and Kosovo.19 Moscow also perceives a threat in 
the emphasis of the West on the transformation of former Soviet governments and societies – 
including Russia – into more philo-Western ones; the so-called “color revolutions” presented the 
most dangerous example of this, to Moscow’s eyes, and are perceived in Russia as coup d’états 
supported and funded by the West rather than organic domestic movements.20 The crisis over and 
conflict in Ukraine have only intensified Russia’s sense of threat from the West, in Moscow’s view 
validating its judgment that the West is seeking to further shrink Russia’s area of influence with the 
ultimate goal of toppling and perhaps dismembering the existing Russian state. In light of this and 
Russian elites’ assessment that the United States and NATO are seeking to hobble or transform 
Russia, this means that Moscow continues to see the United States and NATO as primary threats.  
 
In light of these starkly differing and in key respects opposed perspectives, it seems plausible that 
conflict involving Russia and one or some of these states, including those that are members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, could break out. Such a conflict might emerge from an escalation of the ongoing 
conflict in Ukraine, disputes over the orientation of Moscow-affiliated states like Belarus, the 
handling of internal political reform in such countries, attempts by the Kremlin to engineer or 
capitalize upon unrest in NATO states among Russophone or Russophile populations, and even 
outright attempts by Russia to seize territory it regards as having been illegitimately severed from it 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
These or comparable political disputes could lead to the involvement of Russian-aligned “hybrid” 
elements (such as the much-discussed “little green men”) and, if the conflict intensified, an assault 
by regular Russian forces.21 If the contest were to take place on NATO territory, this would 
presumably entail hostile contact between such Russian forces and those of NATO or at least some 
subset of NATO countries, as the Alliance would need to respond forcefully and ultimately 
effectively to such an armed assault on the part of Moscow. A failure to reply in such a fashion 
would call into question the efficacy, credibility, and ultimately the viability of the Atlantic Alliance, 
with dramatic potential repercussions.  
 
Thus conflict between Washington as well as its NATO allies and Russia appears cognizable. The 
United States and the Alliance as a whole must therefore plan seriously for the possibility of war 
with Russia, above all to seek to effectively deter it.  
 
The Need for an Adapted Limited War Strategy – and the Challenges to Developing One    
                                       
19 See, for instance, The Kremlin, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, II/8/a, 3, in 
translation provided by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.   
20 See, for instance, Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of a World 
Destabilized by the U.S. and the West” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 28, 2014), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Full.pdf and Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Says 
Russia Must Prevent ‘Color Revolution’,” Reuters, November 20, 2014, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/20/us-russia-putin-security-idUSKCN0J41J620141120.  
21 For a discussion of Russia’s “hybrid” approach to warfare and coercion, see David Johnson, “Russia’s Approach to 
Conflict – Implications for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence,” NATO Defense College Research Paper 111, (Rome: 
NATO Defense College, April 2015), http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=797.     










Because of the growing challenge posed to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe, 
it is incumbent upon the U.S. Government and especially the Department of Defense to plan and 
prepare for conflict with China and Russia – even as broader U.S. policy rightfully seeks to avoid the 
need to implement such plans. This is well recognized, and has powered a focused effort by the 
United States to maintain and extend its increasingly pressed military advantages in these two 
regions through such initiatives as the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy, NATO’s efforts to 
strengthen its military posture in Eastern Europe, and deeper collaboration with allies in the Asia-
Pacific.22  
 
While such preparations are vital to adequately ready U.S. and, as appropriate, allied forces in case of 
conflict actually breaking out, they are also essential for effective deterrence, and thus contribute to 
stability.23 Indeed, perhaps the best way to avoid conflict while protecting U.S. interests is precisely 
to prepare and plan for war with the PRC and Russia, and to do so effectively and evidently. 
Deterrence, after all, derives most reliably from persuading a potential adversary such as China or 
Russia that an attempt to use force against U.S. interests will fail, incur costs out of proportion with 
plausible gains, or result in both.24 Effective deterrence, combined of course with a reasonable and 
sufficiently conciliatory approach to political issues, should therefore contribute to peace rather than 
detract from it.  
 
But the problem is that deterrence of both of these countries has become more difficult, and is likely 
to become more so, due to the increase in their military power in recent years. To deter China or 
Russia, the United States needs a military strategy and posture that can genuinely persuade them that 
the use of force against U.S. and allied interests will fail or will result in costs that outweigh any gains 
(or both). But to be able to achieve this effect, U.S. strategy and posture must be both effective and 
credible – in other words, they should appear to reflect capabilities and plans for their use that 
would not only persuade or compel the opponent to back down but also would plausibly be 
ordered, despite their attendant risks, by accountable political leadership. The necessary corollary of 
this is that such a strategy must not only be militarily effective (either in blocking aggression or 
imposing costs) but must be limited.25  
 
                                       
22 For a Department of Defense explication of the Third Offset Strategy, see Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, 
“The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies,” Speech at the Willard Hotel, Washington, 
D.C, January 28, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-
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“NATO boosts its defence and deterrence posture,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 10, 2016, 
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implications for China see, Greg Torode and Megha Rajagopalan, “China faces headache from warming Vietnam-U.S. 
ties,” Reuters, May 27, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-headache-idUSKCN0YI0FK . 
23 For the relationship between deterrence and stability, see Elbridge Colby, “Reconciling Stability and Deterrence,” in 
Elbridge Colby and Michael Gerson, eds. Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations e(Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 
2013). 
24 See, for instance, United States Department of Defense, Deterrence Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, December 2006, 
24.  
25 For the author’s analysis of the growing salience of limited war problems in U.S. strategy, see “Preparing for Limited 
War,” The National Interest, November/December 2015.  









This stems from a basic reality: that U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe are, 
while highly important, still only partial.26 Thus the United States needs to correlate the damage and 
risk it assumes in the service of such interests to their importance. Limitation is good for its own 
sake, as it seeks to properly match U.S. costs and risks with the depth of U.S. interests, but it is also 
important for the credibility of U.S. deterrent posture, since a posture and plan that are rationally 
correlated to the intensity of U.S. interests will be seen as more likely to be implemented and thus 
will exercise greater coercive influence.  
 
Of course, U.S. interests in the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe have always been partial, and 
thus the United States has long planned for a limited war with China and Russia.27 What is changing, 
however, is the difficulty of limiting a war with China or Russia while also achieving U.S. political 
aims.  
 
In the case of maritime Asia, U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific historically relied on substantially 
superior U.S. military power both to prevail in a conflict and to limit it in ways that correlated the 
scale and scope of the conflict with necessarily limited U.S. interests. If Beijing exceeded the U.S.’s 
preferred boundaries for any conflict, the United States had the ability to prevail over China or 
punish the PRC well beyond what it could do in reply. In practice, U.S. capability simply dominated 
China’s in maritime Asia, effectively nullifying China’s in some respects superior will. For instance, 
while the PRC may have been willing to suffer a great deal to seize Taiwan in the decades following 
the end of the Civil War, it simply could not do so if the United States countered such a move – as 
Washington brought home to Beijing in the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-6.28  
 
In the case of Russia, in the twenty years following the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of 
the Red Army, Moscow lost the capability to project significant, first-rate military power beyond its 
borders, particularly conventional forces. The Russian armed forces in the 1990s were in a sorry 
state. And while under the leadership of Vladimir Putin the Russian government began a substantial 
military modernization program in the early 2000s, this had borne relatively little fruit by the end of 
the decade, when Russian armed forces were judged to have performed poorly in the 2008 war with 
Georgia.29 As a practical matter, then, Russia posed only a modest meaningful threat to new NATO 
                                       
26 This is distinct from Hugh White’s position that China presents the U.S with its most pressing challenge, as presented 
in The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne, Australia: Black Inc., 2012) . U.S. interests in Asia are 
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27 For a discussion of U.S. limited war considerations versus the Soviet Union and China see Henry A. Kissinger, The 
Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1960), 57-98.  For the nuclear context, see Jeffrey A. 
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29 See Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, “The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications” 
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members in Eastern Europe through the 1990s and 2000s. As with China, the United States, with its 
vastly superior power projection forces, could dominate and set the bounds of any plausible contest 
with Moscow over NATO territory. Russia’s nuclear arsenal, while large and formidable, was, 
meanwhile, of modest utility in such limited contingencies absent non-nuclear forces on which to 
shape credible threats to escalate to the strategic level.  
 
But both nations have strengthened their militaries substantially in ways that make this traditional 
formula of American advantage decreasingly tenable. This is leading to a situation in which the 
United States will be far more challenged in its ability both to win and to palatably limit a war with 
either China or Russia.  
 
In the case of China, this conclusion stems from the simple fact that China is becoming dramatically 
stronger. As has been amply documented, the PRC is developing an increasingly formidable 
conventional military that is challenging U.S. military superiority in the Western Pacific.30 Thus, 
while the balance of resolve between the United States and China does not appear to have changed 
appreciably over key points of dispute in the region, the balance of military capability is shifting in 
China’s direction, possibly sharply. In particular, China’s major military buildup is giving it a growing 
ability to challenge and, in some contingencies, possibly to block effective U.S. power projection and 
intervention in the Western Pacific.31  
 
This growing power is likely to lead to a more assertive and ambitious policy on Beijing’s part, as 
resolve and aspiration generally follow in the train of capability. Indeed, there is already substantial 
evidence that this happening.32 Many observers judge that China’s more assertive policies in the 
South and East China Seas can be traced to its greater ability to project power into these regions and 
beyond.33 This may make conflict more likely, as China may judge it has a better chance of prevailing 
against the United States, especially if it can persuade the United States to terminate a war without 
bringing its full strength to bear.  
 
In the case of Russia, meanwhile, the greater difficulty the United States would face in favorably 
controlling a war stems from the marked improvement in Russia’s non-nuclear forces and its 
retention and modernization of its nuclear arsenal. Since 2000 and increasingly after the 
embarrassing performance in the war in Georgia, Moscow has invested substantial and sustained 
effort and resources to modernize and strengthen the nation’s military after its semi-collapse in the 
years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
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In particular, Russia has been seeking to build a military capable of taking on forces (especially those 
of NATO and particularly the United States) able to conduct highly-sophisticated, integrated, and 
decisive operations employing the most modern technology.34 As a result, Russia is increasingly 
fielding some of the world’s most advanced and sophisticated air defense, anti-satellite, armored, 
electronic warfare, and other key military systems. Together, these capabilities are presenting NATO 
with a very tough and large anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) umbrella, menacing precision-strike 
complexes, and formidable offensive mobile forces able to rapidly seize ground and then defend it.35 
By 2020 Moscow plans (albeit aspirationally) for the Russian military to be structured around 
combat-ready and readily deployable brigades, of which 70% will be equipped with the latest arms 
and equipment, and to boast of large numbers of new tanks, aircraft, ships, submarines, and 
satellites.36 Already, however, the RAND Corporation has judged that Russia could seize the Baltic 
states from the Alliance within a matter of days – a fact that will hold true even with the larger 
presence pledged for the eastern Allied member states at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit.37 
 
The growth of Chinese and the resurgence of Russian military power is already reducing the 
effectiveness of the legacy U.S. approach to extending deterrence by relying on its dominant power 
projection capability. In Asia, China’s greater power will make U.S. efforts to deny Beijing the 
achievement of its military objectives more and more difficult, reducing the degree to which the 
United States can reasonably rely on its traditional deterrence and war limitation formula of clear 
military superiority. Meanwhile, Russia’s advantages in the pace with which it can apply superior 
force will give it substantial fait accompli and coup de main options and its formidable A2/AD and strike 
networks will require the United States and NATO to undertake a much larger effort to eject any 
such intrusions. Consequently, it will be far harder for the United States simply to prevail in a 
conflict with either China or Russia (although considerably more so in the case of the former than 
                                       
34 For overviews of this effort and the logic behind it, see Nikolas Gvosdev, “The Bear Awakens: Russia’s Military is 
Back,” The National Interest, November 12, 2014, available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russias-military-
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the latter). This poses in and of itself a severe challenge, a challenge that is the subject of an 
increasing corpus of excellent analysis.38 
 
But these trends will also mean that it will be far harder for the United States to control any such 
conflict. This is because the United States will have to fight harder, deeper, longer, more quickly and 
with less deliberation, and over a much wider battlefield to take on and try to prevail against such 
capable opponents. In brief, the United States will no longer so clearly enjoy the prerogative of 
getting to set the pace, scope, and rules of the engagement as it did in the era of its nearly unfettered 
military dominance.39   
 
This alone will add significantly to the risk of escalation, including to the nuclear level. For instance, 
given the longer range and effectiveness of modern Russian and Chinese air defense systems, the 
United States might have to strike at such systems over a far greater swath of territory than in the 
past, making the territory involved in a conflict much wider. Likewise, the United States may need to 
strike at missile bases that share command and control or other functions with nuclear forces, 
raising the risk that attacks on those bases will appear as strikes at the opponent’s nuclear 
capability.40  
 
Similarly, mobile systems are of growing importance in the inventories of China and Russia for a 
range of functions such as precision strike, command and control, counterspace, and air defense. 
Yet these systems are inherently more difficult to target and destroy than fixed systems, and effective 
targeting of them requires exquisite intelligence and prompt strike capabilities. Accordingly, the 
United States may feel the need to act more rapidly, less deliberately, and based on more imperfect 
intelligence, to strike at these targets, making the control of escalation more challenging.  
 
In such a context, the United States will face increasingly severe tradeoffs between military 
effectiveness and limiting escalation. This sort of dynamic will make the control of escalation far 
more challenging since simply prevailing will be so much more difficult and involve steps with a 
considerably higher potential to spark meaningful Russian or Chinese counterescalation.41 Such 
dynamics will also be more likely to implicate nuclear forces since such forces or their supporting or 
enabling capabilities may become embroiled in the necessarily wider and more savage conflict. Thus 
the United States will face greater challenges to its ability to prosecute such a war effectively and less 
discretion in determining what the boundaries of such a conflict would be.  
 
Nor will nuclear forces become more salient just because of the possibility of inadvertent or 
accidental escalation. Rather, both Russia and, to a lesser but growing extent, China will have 
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options for employing nuclear weapons and other capabilities, such as cyber weapons, deliberately 
for strategic effect in ways that could substantially influence the outcome of the conflict.  
 
This is particularly salient in the case of Russia. While Russia’s conventional military has improved 
markedly since its nadir in the 1990s, it is still a far cry from matching that of NATO and especially 
the United States in any persisting conflict in which the latter could bring to bear the full force of 
their military power. U.S. and NATO advantages greatly surpass those of Russia in economic 
strength, technology, and simple size. The GDP of the NATO alliance, to take just one measure, is 
an order of magnitude larger than that of Russia’s, and the Alliance spends a great deal more than 
Moscow on defense.42 Therefore, should NATO’s resolve be sufficiently strong, there is little reason 
to see why it would not prevail against Russia over any plausible contingency touching on NATO’s 
territorial integrity, though the costs of that effort might be quite grave.  
 
This reality is not lost on Moscow. Russia is acutely conscious of its conventional military’s 
continuing weakness relative to that of the United States and NATO. Moscow appears to 
understand well – perhaps even too well – that a conventional conflict would likely result in 
embarrassing defeat for Russia.43 This leaves a significant gap in Russia’s defense posture: left alone, 
Russia’s conventional forces could be decisively overcome by NATO forces in a plausible conflict 
over, for instance, the Baltics or other countries in Eastern Europe. Such a scenario would likely fall 
considerably short of a situation in which Moscow would see the utility in initiating a general nuclear 
strike against NATO, a strike that would essentially inevitably result in a comparable massive 
Western response. Russia could therefore find itself exposed to Western coercion if this gap 
between its more potent but still inferior conventional forces and the very menacing but not very 
credible threat of large-scale nuclear attack were left unaddressed.44 For Moscow to prevail in any 
contest with the United States and NATO, therefore, Russia appears to understand that it must 
bring to bear some kind of coercive influence in between its local conventional forces and a large 
strategic attack if it is to have a reasonable of persuading the Alliance to back down.  
 
Russia appears to see its nuclear weapons and, more indirectly, its other strategic capabilities as 
suited for this purpose. Public discussion has tended to describe this approach as an “escalate to 
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deescalate” strategy – an attempt to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in the midst of a 
(presumably failing) conventional conflict in order to spook the (again, presumably conventionally 
superior) opponent to back down and concede. The logic of the approach appears to be to escalate 
to a limited employment of nuclear or strategic weapons, with the idea of demonstrating Moscow’s 
resolve and its ability to do great harm and risk escalation, blunt the opponent’s conventional 
offensive, and challenge the adversary’s resolve. It is not a strategy of nuclear dominance, but rather 
one that seeks to exploit Russia’s very large and sophisticated arsenal, which the United States 
cannot realistically or meaningfully defend against, to force the Alliance to determine whether it 
wants to risk nuclear Armageddon in the service of defending what to many will seem to be 
peripheral interests.   
 
The effect of this strategy and set of capabilities would not only be relevant in extremis, but could 
also be used to shadow the Alliance’s decisionmaking about how it would wage a counterattack 
against a Russian assault against NATO territory. Russia’s capability to escalate to the nuclear level, 
in other words, will clearly shape and influence how the United States and its allies think about the 
ferocity, scale, depth, and other factors defining their counterattack. If this shadow is dark enough, it 
could narrow these factors to such a degree that the Alliance’s counteroffensive will be too meek to 
succeed.  
 
The case of China echoes this dynamic, but with importantly different accents. In the PRC’s case, 
the conventional challenge is likely to become considerably more severe, with the nuclear aspect 
probably playing a narrower but still potentially crucial role. This is because, at the same time as the 
United States must grapple with greatly improved Chinese capabilities to contest it in a limited war, 
China is also gaining a greater ability to inflict pain and damage upon the United States and its allies 
and partners, including in ways not directly related to the local conflict itself.  
 
This growing ability stems from a variety of factors: China’s greater economic strength and leverage, 
which will give it the ability to hold the U.S. economy at risk; the PLA’s greater conventional strike 
capabilities, which will give China the ability to attack U.S. territories and bases, U.S. allies like Japan 
and the Philippines, and commerce moving through regional sea and air lines of communication; 
and, most dramatically, China’s modernizing and increasingly survivable nuclear strike forces, which 
will enable the PRC to conduct nuclear strikes against the United States and U.S. allies, very likely 
even after any U.S. attempt at preemption. China could use any of these capabilities to do great 
damage to the United States or its allies or partners, and each of them is at least somewhat resilient 
or even immune to U.S. preventive or defensive steps.  
 
This means that the United States is very likely to be significantly vulnerable to Chinese actions in 
the event of war – a much changed dynamic even from the 1990s. China’s abilities to impose costs 
will diminish the allure for the United States of relying on the classic deterrence alternative to 
denying an adversary’s ability to achieve his objectives: imposing costs. This is because the United 
States will be increasingly vulnerable to Chinese counter-imposition of costs if it elects to pursue this 
method of seeking to coerce China in the event of conflict. 
 
This problem will be especially severe with respect to the PRC’s nuclear forces. As China 
modernizes and (thus far, at least) modestly expands its nuclear force, it will very likely increasingly 









be recognized as having a secure second strike capability – that is, the ability to launch at least some 
portion of its nuclear forces even in the event of an attempted U.S. disarming or decapitating first 
strike.45 This will inevitably induce caution in U.S. decision makers contemplating taking on or 
escalating against China.  
 
Nor will China’s improving nuclear capabilities be limited to existential or totalistic threats. Rather, 
the modernization of China’s nuclear forces and of their supporting and enabling capabilities will 
give the PRC increasing flexibility in its options for employment of those forces – against military 
forces or regional targets, for instance. This will give Beijing more options for employing its nuclear 
weapons, particularly in more limited ways. This does not mean that China will reach for the nuclear 
saber early or often. But it will make Chinese threats to resort to nuclear use if Beijing feels 
sufficiently pushed more plausible and more credible, and thus more coercively valuable. In a limited 
conflict with the United States, China will have better options for how it might seek to break U.S. 
will in a conflict and will have a more credible and therefore better deterrent to U.S. escalation of a 
conflict – escalation the United States might need to resort to if it is to prevail.46 
 
Accordingly, this combination of factors is making the traditional U.S. deterrent posture against 
both Russia and China, based primarily on the ability of far superior U.S. power projection 
capabilities to readily defeat or block any attacks from them within parameters both palatable and 
convenient for the United States, increasingly ill-suited to the emerging strategic landscape in 
Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. The United States thus faces a situation in which its legacy 
deterrent strategy is becoming less and less effective against a revanchist Russia with a plausible 
offensive strategy and against an increasingly powerful and assertive China. At the same time, the 
United States has important interests in Europe and Asia, including longstanding alliances and 
partnerships, that it is not willing to abandon. The United States therefore finds itself in the position 
of wanting to continue to deter Russia and China from molesting its and its allies’ interests – but 
needing to adapt its defense and deterrent strategy to the realities of an alienated and dangerous 
Russia and a greatly more capable and likely more ambitious PRC.    
 
The United States therefore needs to be able to fight a limited war against China or Russia over 
interests in maritime Asia or Eastern Europe that are important but still partial – and fight such a 
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war more effectively than Beijing or Moscow in ways that allow Washington to achieve some 
reasonable approximation of its political objectives. This means being able simultaneously to limit 
the scope and violence of the war sufficiently to correlate it to the interests at stake but also allow 
the United States to conduct military operations effectively enough to achieve Washington’s 
political-military aims.  
 
The best way to deal with this problem is for the United States to become better at limited war than 
these potential adversaries. This means that the United States should find effective ways to fight to 
achieve its political objectives while at the same time meaningfully constraining the war with these 
formidable opponents. The way to do this is for the United States to be able to more effectively 
operate within, manipulate, and exploit the boundaries of a war both sides are seeking to limit in 
order to attain those ends Washington deems vital.  
 
That is, the United States should be ready to strive to set or at least substantially influence the 
(explicit or implicit) formulae of limitation in any war in which it finds itself engaged, and should be 
prepared to exploit them effectively, as well as any alternative plausible boundaries of a conflict. In 
other words, the United States should have a clear idea of what it wants the boundaries of constraint 
to look like in potential conflicts with Russia or China, and a plan for how it would advance its 
arguments for those boundaries. It must also have a realistic assessment as to what the limits would 
actually end up looking like. That is, the United States should be prepared to operate well not only 
under its preferred but also under the most likely parameters of a limited war. And it and its allies 
should have the military capabilities and, perhaps more importantly, the plans, doctrines and 
strategies ready to operate effectively and ultimately prevail within these boundaries. 
 
To give a concrete example of how these dynamics might unfold, a conflict might arise between the 
United States and NATO on one side and Russia on the other out of a controversy involving the 
Russophile population of a Baltic NATO state. In such a scenario, Moscow might intervene to 
defend or vindicate the purportedly aggrieved minority using some of the readily deployable 
conventional forces it has built up in recent years and has been exercising regularly since the 
beginning of the Ukraine crisis. In such a case, Russia would also rely on more sophisticated forces 
across the border in sovereign Russian territory to provide a range of crucial missions such as air 
defense, long-range strike and attacks on U.S. space assets. An adequate response by the Atlantic 
alliance to eject Russian forces and restore the territorial integrity of a NATO member state would 
require, as a matter of course, the suppression or denial of at least some of these more sophisticated 
forces that otherwise would menace the crucial Allied—and most importantly American— 
aerospace and maritime forces that provide the basis for Western military superiority.  
 
Yet, seeking to manipulate the logic of limited war, Moscow could demand that the homelands of 
the major powers be considered sanctuary and that the conflict be confined to the territory and 
airspace of the Baltic states. Or it might declare that only a narrow band of Russian territory abutting 
the invaded Baltic states should be considered legitimate territory for combat. And Moscow could 
threaten to enforce those limitations with its strategic capabilities, including its large and variegated 
arsenal of nuclear weapons. If NATO ignored these proposed limitations without offering a 
compelling basis of limitation of its own and pursued Russian forces well within Russian territory, it 
might trigger Moscow’s use of nuclear weapons in a way that could look like Russia was simply 









defending itself, shifting the onus to respond onto NATO in a manner that might make such a 
response seem unjustified or too risky. But, alternatively, if NATO agreed to Moscow’s proposed 
terms of restraint, Russia might be able to leverage such limitation to protect and exploit its crucial 
antiaccess/area denial capabilities. Moscow could, for instance, bring its increasingly lethal and long-
range surface-to-air missile systems into and out of the combat zone as needed, removing them for 
protection upon notice of vulnerability and for resupply. Such stratagems could give Russia a 
decisive edge in the conflict, as it could use such forces to blunt NATO air attacks, potentially 
denying the Atlantic alliance vital air superiority over the Baltics.47 
 
A similar dynamic might take hold in the event of a U.S. conflict with China over Taiwan or 
territories in the East China Sea, where the People’s Liberation Army could seek to shape the 
boundaries of a limited war to use its increasingly advanced capabilities, including its cutting-edge air 
defense and antiship systems, on the Chinese mainland to hold aerospace and maritime targets at 
risk anywhere over or around the island of Taiwan or over the Senkaku Islands. Without suppressing 
such threats, the United States and its allies or partners would have little realistic hope of 
reestablishing decisive control over Taiwan or the Senkakus. But simply attacking targets on the 
mainland without some compelling and reasonable basis for limitation would make it appear that it 
is the United States that is the true aggressor, weakening the U.S. position in the contest of resolve.  
 
The United States must be better prepared to take advantage of this dynamic of potential escalation. 
Thus, for instance, when it comes to the Baltic states, the United States and NATO should have 
ready their own proposal for the appropriate bases on which to limit such a war, a proposal that 
Moscow would find it difficult to reject but which NATO is well-prepared to exploit. NATO should 
also be ready to deal effectively within the confines of what seem to be the most likely boundaries of 
the conflict. The same holds true for the United States with respect to a potential conflict with 
China over Taiwan or islets in the South or East China Sea. 48 
 
The challenges to crafting such a revised strategy are daunting but not insurmountable. 
Fundamentally, it requires a shift in thinking – away from the presumption of dominance that 
permeated U.S. defense and strategic thinking in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
towards a recognition that China and Russia will be able to materially challenge U.S. conventional 
superiority in the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe, and that they have the means to painfully 
escalate. Thus the United States must adapt its strategy so that it can both limit a conflict with the 
PRC or Russia but also to prevail in it.  
 
The question, then, is how to do this.  
 
The U.S. Government: Behind the Curve  
 
                                       
47 For further explorations, see Forrest E.  Morgan, “Dancing with the Bear: Managing Escalation in a Conflict with 
Russia,” Proliferation Papers, No. 40, (The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri),Winter 2012), and the 
author’s “Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a Nuclear Blind Spot in the Pentagon’s New 
Initiative,” (Center for a New American Security, February 2015), http://www.cnas.org/avoiding-nuclear-blindspot-
offset-strategy#.V5T21VdLdIc. 
48 This section is partially drawn from the author’s “Preparing for Limited War,” The National Interest. 









The U.S. Government and especially the Defense Department therefore need to prepare for a 
conflict with China or Russia in which the United States can limit escalation and yet still prevail, but 
in which both of those objectives will be considerably more difficult. Accordingly, the United States 
needs to be prepared – intellectually, doctrinally, and programmatically – to fight and succeed in a 
limited war with China or Russia.  
 
The problem is that the Defense Department, the defense analytic community, and the scholarly 
world more broadly are not, on the whole, well prepared to take on this set of questions. While the 
challenge of conducting a successful limited war is not a new phenomenon, it remains an unfamiliar 
one for most of the current generation of policymakers, strategists, and defense planners. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed military superiority over any potential adversary 
in any plausible military contingency, and so “the American Way of War” moved sharply in the 
direction of “shock and awe” – an effort which clearly and pointedly rejected the need for mutual 
limitation of the conflict. At the same time, U.S. nuclear weapons and the escalation concerns they 
prompted were largely relegated to use in extreme scenarios and nuclear policy became largely 
“ghettoized.”  
 
Indeed, a whole generation of military personnel and defense strategists have been educated, 
promoted, and tested in a strategic environment in which coming to favorable mutual agreement 
with an adversary to cabin conflict seemed unnecessary, if not foolhardy, and in which nuclear 
employment seemed a remote possibility. Accordingly, this generation emphasized the preeminence 
of gaining, holding, and exploiting all advantages in a conflict to press and decisively defeat an 
opponent using conventional forces. This made good sense when the United States faced (and still 
makes good sense when it faces) rivals that could not challenge it outside of the theater of conflict 
or impose costs that would necessitate the limitation of the war. But, as described above, this 
situation will no longer obtain vis a vis China or Russia.  
 
Awareness of this problem has increased in recent years as elements of the U.S. defense 
establishment and external defense policy community have become increasingly cognizant of and 
concerned by the growing military strength of major power potential adversaries like China and by 
the role nuclear weapons appear to play in their strategies.49 U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 
and elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Navy, and the Air Force have in 
particular become increasingly seized with the problem of the limitation of conflicts that could 
escalate dramatically.50 U.S. Pacific Command has also engaged more with the problems of difficult-
                                       
49 See, for instance, U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (2014), 7-8,15. 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.  See also Bradley H. Roberts, The Case for 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2015).    
50 See Admiral Cecil Haney’s speech at 2015 STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium, particularly his slide depiction, for a 
description of the role of deterrence, and potential escalation points, across the spectrum of conflict from pre-conflict to 
total nuclear war.   “Deterrence Symposium Opening Remarks,” U.S. Strategic Command, July 29, 2015, 
https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2015/136/Deterrence_Symposium_Opening_Remarks/.    









to-control conflict and with the possibility of nuclear use.51 European Command and NATO are 
also increasingly focused on escalation and nuclear issues.52 
 
At the same time, this has encouraged an increasingly vigorous discussion and debate in the open 
literature about how the United States can and should grapple with the problems of escalation and 
combating a nuclear-armed opponent.53 Yet, while there have been laudable and insightful studies on 
the problems of conducting limited war and managing escalation with nuclear-armed opponents, 
these studies have primarily focused on dealing with regional adversaries, primarily North Korea, or 
on the Indo-Pakistani context.54 Studies on the problems of favorably managing escalation with the 
more powerful and assertive China and Russia we are now facing are far rarer, and are particularly 
rare in addressing the question across the conventional-nuclear threshold.55 Those that do exist, 
                                       
51 “Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” U.S. Senate, February 23, 2016, http://www.armed-
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52  See General Phil Breedlove, “U.S. European Command Posture Statement 2016,” United States European 
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53 For a signal contribution, see Vincent Manzo, “After the First Shots: Managing Escalation in Northeast Asia,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly 77 (2nd Quarter, 2015), 91-100.  http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-77/jfq-77_91-
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Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security, 30 no. 2 (Fall 2005), 127-152; Sumit Ganguly 
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meanwhile, tend to be more focused and shorter studies, and have particularly focused on 
identifying particular military dynamics and crisis management mechanisms rather than developing a 
fuller conceptual framework for thinking about the problem. Moreover, the focus has tended to go 
largely towards conventional forces, with the problem of nuclear escalation falling on one of two 
extremes – either an almost blithe assumption that restraint will obtain or an almost credulous belief 
that nuclear use will invariably take place.56  Very little serious analysis has gone into how that 
likelihood can be variously understood and thus how it can be modulated and consciously 
manipulated.  
 
The existing discussion therefore reflects a considerable development in analysis of this knotty set of 
problems, but is far from sufficient. Responsible U.S. officials, both civilian and military; defense 
analysts; and scholars can now tap on a growing sophisticated body of literature and expertise on 
limited war and escalation management issues, both within and outside the Government. This 
provides a highly valuable lode of insights and recommendations for how to wrestle with the 
challenge.  
 
Yet such officials, those who influence them, and the broader public interested in this increasingly 
important topic lack a fuller analysis of this problem. In part, they lack a clear, consolidated 
framework for approaching, evaluating, and making decisions or recommendations with respect to 
how best to conduct a limited war effectively against an opponent like China or Russia. In particular, 
these audiences need a framework that can help provide a useful and structured aid for answering 
questions such as: What are the essential dynamics in a limited war between two relatively 
comparable (at least with respect to a given contingency) military powers armed with survivable 
nuclear arsenals? In light of this, how should the United States approach thinking about seeking to 
favorably limit war with China or Russia? What are the potential options for doing so? What 
strategies can be employed to leverage these options?  
 
This study is not designed to serve as an instruction manual, let alone to provide the specifics for 
new war plans. Neither is it intended to present a theory for how limited wars will necessarily 
unfold. Rather, its aim is to elucidate the nature of limited war – an elusive task – and to provide a 
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Northeast Asia”; and Caitlin Talmadge, “Preventing Nuclear Escalation in the U.S.-China Conflict,” George Washington 
University Institute for Security and Conflict Studies Policy Brief, February 2016, available at 
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Defining a Limited War 
 
In its essence, a limited war is one in which the combatants recognize, establish, and/or agree to 
boundaries, limits, or thresholds within a conflict, and acknowledge and/or seek to have 
acknowledged that transgressing these parameters will constitute an escalation of the conflict, 
escalation that is more likely to incur retaliation or counter-escalation on the part of the demanding 
contestant and/or third parties.57 The idea of such restraint is to shape the conflict in ways that 
meaningfully and, ideally, favorably confine the conflict. Thus a limited war is a conflict that, 
whether by necessity or choice, is understood by both combatants to involve some boundaries – 
even shifting and malleable ones – boundaries which one or both of the adversaries consent, with 
more or less strictness, to observe.58 At a very basic level, limited wars are an expression of 
mankind’s urge, need, or desire to fight without risking everything on the combat.  
 
Thus a limited war is defined by the existence of and adherence to “rule sets” within the struggle. 
These are the rules, the explicitly or implicitly agreed laws restraining the intensity and vehemence of 
the fight and the lengths to which the combatants will go. They are akin to rules in boxing, where 
“below the belt” hits are prohibited, or wrestling, where scratching and punching are barred; in both 
sports, moreover, contestants agree not to hurt each other too much, and matches are called if 
things go too far. Unlike in sports, however, “rule sets” in a limited war are themselves subject to 
modification and influence during a conflict. Indeed they are a front of their own. These “rule sets” 
may be more or less admirable, binding, logical, or well-established; their essence is simply that the 
two sides agree in some way that the way they wage the war and the objectives they pursue will be 
constrained in some evident fashion.  
 
It is important to emphasize that a limited war is defined simply by deliberate and meaningful 
restraint through such “rule sets” in the course of conflict, not by symmetry, formality, or 
immutability. Such restraint may be reciprocal and mirroring, but does not need to be. For instance, 
the other side may offer asymmetrical forms of restraint that are sufficient to the first side’s 
purposes even if those are not identical. Indeed, one side may not materially limit itself at all, as the 
other may limit its efforts and goals for reasons other than the desire for reciprocity. Moreover, 
conducting a limited war does not necessitate formal agreement to the limits assumed. Rather, it 
means simply that some such boundaries are acknowledged and observed; such acknowledgement 
                                       
57 The conceptual literature on limited war is extensive. For the most influential, see Robert Osgood, Limited War 
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may be either explicitly or implicitly accepted and observed.59 And limited war does not denote the 
imposition of fixed, immutable rules. Rather, the boundaries of conflict can be changed and violated 
in the midst of a limited war and yet the struggle can remain subject to limitation, just as deterrence 
can and usually does still operate even if it has failed in some form (i.e., intrawar deterrence). A 
conflict will remain limited in its essence as long as at least one side materially constrains itself.  
 
In sum, the limitation of war is an inherently malleable and interactive endeavor, one that is not 
fixed in advance but subject to shaping and change. It therefore allows for latitude – often great 
latitude – in the establishment and amendment of its formulae for constraint, and thus opens the 
field for strategy – for the deliberate shaping and exploitation of these formulae for one’s purposes.60  
 
In other words, determining how a war will be restrained and how well prepared one is to exploit 
those arrangements are crucial and indeed may well determine its outcome. That is, while a limited 
war is by definition limited, it is also by definition a war, and thus remains a contest for, if not 
victory—since a limited war means that objectives must be made more modest—then at least for 
which side will more fully achieve its more modest aims. And so, within the necessarily fragile and 
elastic confines of a limited war, both sides can and will jockey, bluff, coerce and fight to gain 
advantage. In short, the side that has the better strategy, and the one better and more aptly reflected 
in its military and political-diplomatic posture, is likely to have the advantage. 
 
Prevailing in a Limited War  
 
How, then, should a combatant think about favorably limiting a war? This is a crucial question with 
profound implications not only for defense posture and strategy but for national policy, as the more 
effective one’s defense strategy is, the more options and scope are opened for national policy – and 
vice versa. Naturally, though, because the particular nature, intensity, stakes, and origins of a war are 
inherently unpredictable in advance and thus not susceptible to precise calculation, there cannot be a 
set menu or formula for how to advantageously bound a conflict with a potential adversary.  
 
Nonetheless, it is possible to elucidate what the core logic of an effective limited war strategy is, 
including in the most taxing context in which one faces an adversary possessed of some form of 
formidable conventional forces and a survivable nuclear arsenal sufficiently large and sophisticated 
to assuredly do great damage to its victim. In this kind of relationship, any conflict between such 
states would necessarily be darkly shadowed by the possibility of escalation, particularly to the 
nuclear level – any war between such combatants would, in some sense, always and invariably be a 
“nuclear war” because of the shadow and fear of escalation to that terrible level. In such a conflict, 
both sides would take decisions and action with the knowledge that the opponent could, whatever 
one did, wreak the gravest kind of harm upon one’s self and that there is essentially nothing one 
could do to prevent that if the opponent elects to do so.  
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In order to avoid triggering this grievous outcome, both sides would therefore have the strongest 
possible incentives to constrain the conflict, both in the way they fought it and the objectives they 
sought. Accordingly, the warring parties would almost certainly observe boundaries in the conflict 
with the intent of signaling to the opponent that the conflict was not sufficiently fundamental or 
dangerous as to justify large-scale nuclear use. Equally, the two sides would very probably pursue 
aims that would not result in the vanquishing of the other combatant, since this would be too likely 
to push the opponent into considering such action.  
 
The objective in such a war would be to achieve some meaningful approximation of one’s political-
military goals but to stop short of catalyzing the opponent’s use of his most destructive capabilities. 
Thus concluding a limited war between such capable opponents necessarily means that both sides 
must ultimately agree to stop fighting. That is, concession would come, at least to some substantial 
degree, as a matter of voluntary choice rather than strict compulsion. Limited wars do not end, in 
other words, by marching into the opponent’s capital and judging the opposing leadership. Such 
pursuit would be far too likely to trigger nuclear or other devastating attacks. This does not mean 
that both sides must come out equally at the close of a conflict but simply that the war concludes 
with both sides having meaningfully constrained the violence they inflicted upon the other. Thus 
limited wars end when both parties – and particularly the relative loser – find settlement less 
distasteful than further fighting and in particular than further escalation, including nuclear escalation.  
 
Such a decision can theoretically take place for any number of reasons, but fundamentally it will 
come about because one side is unprepared to continue fighting because the costs and risks of doing 
so are simply too great. It does not mean he is incapable of doing so. Rather it means he elects not to 
do so, most logically and probably because the implications of continuing along the existing 
trajectory entails defeat or exhaustion and those of escalating are too grave, too perilous, too risky, or 
otherwise too unpalatable to accept. Thus the winner in a limited conflict is he who can prevail 
within the boundaries that the parties are observing, and can persuade an adversary that changing 
them would be too costly or risky; the loser is he who is failing within the boundaries observed, and 
cannot find a sufficiently palatable way to change the rules to his advantage.  
 
A winning combatant in a limited war, therefore, is he who is able to use his capabilities, plans, and 
strategies to gain meaningful military advantages relevant to the attainment of his political objectives 
within a given “rule set” of war and then is able to push the onus of escalation—the burden of 
continuing and especially expanding the war—onto his opponents’ shoulders. In essence, the point 
is to be able to overcome an adversary within the confines of a limited, bounded conflict and then 
force the other side to bear the risk, the costs, the opprobrium, and the culpability for changing the 
rules of the war, and particularly for expanding or intensifying the war.  
 
Put metaphorically, it behooves a combatant to be able to create what might be called “ledges” of 
advantage in an escalatory interaction. That is, a side will benefit and ultimately prevail if it can confine or 
bring conflict to a level or set of boundaries at which it has a meaningful advantage, and from which the opponent will 
find it too difficult, frightening, or fruitless to counter-escalate.  
 
Put another way, a limited war between two roughly comparable nuclear-armed states can be likened 
to two men, tied together, jostling for advantage in part by attempting to spook the other into 









submission by pulling each other jointly closer to a fatal precipice. In such a case, the crucial edge 
will be gained by the party that can pull the pair closer to the ledge, in so doing gain an important 
margin of advantage over his adversary (for instance, by placing oneself atop a rock from which to 
strike one’s opponent), and, crucially, settle into a spot from which the opponent will find it just too 
risky or painful to edge any closer to the fatal drop off. Since neither combatant has an interest in 
suicide, at some point moving closer to the edge will just seem too dangerous. The party that has the 
advantage at that stopping point will likely win, just as in blackjack the player with the higher cards 
below 21 wins.  
 
Or, to use another metaphor, if two people are fighting in a rowboat, the same advantage will accrue 
to the pugilist who, while rocking the boat, can gain a point of advantage (perhaps getting a firmer 
hold on his seat and unseating his opponent), and leave the other in the position of fearing too 
much what might happen if he risks rocking the boat further to negate the first’s new margin of 
advantage. This position will be, in colloquial terms, akin to putting one’s opponent in a headlock in 
a schoolyard fight. In such a context, the opponent can still strike for one’s eyes or even pull out a 
concealed knife, but would face grave disincentives to doing so – both from what one might do in 
response with one’s own knife and from the third party repercussions (expulsion, etc.) of doing so.  
 
As in any conflict, advantage in this kind of situation will accrue to the side with the superior mix of 
resolve and capability. In a conflict between two sides with survivable nuclear forces, though, 
resolve will be more important than in a conflict in which the damage the parties (or one party) can 
do is much more limited. Because each party can always “go nuclear” to do unspeakable damage, 
greater resolve to do so or to risk the conflict escalating to such acts will trump more limited 
capability.  
 
Resolve will be crucial in determining who has the edge fundamentally because both sides have the 
ability, by definition, to do the most grievous harm to one another (though not necessarily equally). 
At the logical end of conflict between two sides with survivable, effective nuclear forces is a pure 
contest of who can better and longer bear the pain each can inflict on the other. Thus ultimately, if 
taken to its logical extreme where the parties cannot stop each other from inflicting great (though 
not necessarily equal) pain upon the other, a limited war becomes a pure contest of resolve – a battle 
of knife cuts and ultimately sharp and deep stabs.61 While neither side will want this outcome, the 
side more willing to risk such an exchange – to get closer to the edge or fall in the water or engage in 
the knife fight – will, all things being equal, have an edge. A David who is much smaller and weaker 
than Goliath will nonetheless defeat the giant if the shepherd boy is willing to use his sling while 
Goliath is unwilling to use his sword, just as a weak schoolyard boy more willing to use a knife will 
force down the big bully who is unwilling to use his. Thus resolve is crucial.  
 
But resolve is never an isolated or fixed value. Crucially, resolve is not just a matter of how much 
one wants something but also how much one is willing to risk and suffer to get it. One prospective 
buyer may crave an apartment or auction item more than his competitor, but if the competitor has 
much more money to spend, the cost will be far lower for him and thus it will matter less that he 
does not want it quite as much.  
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Moreover, resolve can change and, more than just change, it can be shaped and influenced. This is 
because resolve is not a product of some disembodied fixity or process. Rather, one’s will to prevail, 
to endure, to fight, to suffer depends not only on the reasons why one began fighting, but also on a 
very wide range of other factors, including factors that can unfold during a conflict and can change 
and shape one’s degree of resolve. Relevant factors informing one’s will to fight include how much 
one has suffered, how the other side behaves and what its perceived ambitions are, beliefs about the 
adversary’s openness to de-escalation and conciliation, the views of third parties, senses of justice 
and legitimacy, and concerns about sunk costs and reputation, to name just a few among the most 
consequential. These factors affect and influence both instrumental calculation of how profitable or 
costly further fighting and escalation are but also moral reasoning and emotions such as anger, 
revenge, fear, and the like.  
 
Thus, for instance, few people during the Second World War or since could detail the actual political 
disputes between the United States and Japan that led to the outbreak of war in 1941, but everyone 
could remember Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and the behavior of Japanese forces on the 
rampage throughout the Asia-Pacific.62 These factors helped lead to a progressive hardening of the 
resolve of the United States to fight on and prevail in the Pacific theater, despite fearsome costs. 
Likewise, the American Civil War began as a relatively narrow struggle about states’ rights and 
Union but expanded to a much broader set of issues, with implications for the ferocity with which 
the war was conducted.63 Conversely, the unfolding of the war in Vietnam led to an erosion of U.S. 
resolve and eventual withdrawal.  
 
Thus external factors other than one’s own desires and preferences will affect resolve, and may push 
one towards further fighting and escalation or towards backing down. The point is simply that 
resolve is measured by how much one is willing to suffer and gamble and is subject to change – and 
thus also to deliberate modulation and exploitation as well. Thus actions one takes can affect both 
the opponent’s and one’s own will to fight.  
 
This is why the onus, the burden of escalation is so important in a contest between two sides armed 
with survivable nuclear forces. Because the other side’s escalation cannot be stopped, his resolve is 
crucial – ultimately it is up to him whether he escalates. But because his resolve is subject to 
modulation based on the costs and risks he will face by escalating, the likelihood he will do so can be 
lessened by weighing down or burdening his decision to do so. The more unpalatable that decision 
can be made, the more taxing it will be for his resolve – and, at some point, just too taxing. The 
United States did not want to abandon South Vietnam, but it finally determined that further 
escalation was, while certainly possible, too painful, while withdrawal was tolerable.  
 
It is important to emphasize, therefore, that a limited war is not solely about resolve and a 
competition in brinksmanship – it is not just about who is brave or committed or crazy enough to 
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keep moving toward the ledge or rocking the boat.64 Rather, it is also about capability – one’s power 
rather than one’s will alone. And by capability we should understand not only raw power but also 
flexibility and particularly the ability to force the other side into unfavorable positions from which 
counterescalating is just too unpalatable.  
 
Capability or strength is relevant not because it will allow one to really dominate, which is not 
feasible if the opponent’s nuclear arsenal is genuinely survivable. Instead, capability or strength will 
give one the opportunity to exploit more “rule sets” and to move more facilely to new “rule sets.” In 
the metaphor, it will enable one to gain the upper hand at more points on the cliff side, to shift more 
readily to new places, and to move closer but not too close to the edge. That is, the stronger party 
will have the upper hand at more places and will be able to move more easily to new places and still 
retain the edge. Or, to continue the blackjack analogy, hands are won by the side willing to get closer 
to the losing 22, but it helps a great deal if one starts out with an 18 or 19 rather than a 12. 
 
Thus, prevailing in a limited war is about who can find a stable “rule set” within which one has an advantage – a 
ledge, to continue the metaphor – from which the disadvantaged opponent will be too afraid or insufficiently motivated 
to escalate further. That is, the side that can bring the conflict to a “rule set” where it has an advantage 
and persuade the adversary to keep it there will have the edge. 
 
Resolve can only do so much against this. The weaker side may be more resolute in some detached 
sense, but if it cannot move the conflict to “rule sets” within which it has an advantage then its 
resolve is unlikely to be availing. This is because, if the weaker side’s options are limited to pulling 
the two sides extremely close to the edge – so close that falling over becomes if not a near-certainty 
than a high probability – or simply over it then it will likely place too onerous a burden on its 
willpower. Even the more resolute opponent does not actually want to commit suicide, even if he 
wants to the other side to think he is prepared for it.  
 
The advantages of strength in a limited war, then, are not solely those of raw power, though that is 
of course important in establishing who has advantages at higher levels of escalation. Rather, they 
are the advantages of suitability, of flexibility, and of the ability to incrementally raise, and thus of 
forcing the other side to have to escalate in ways that are just too big, too dangerous, or too 
improbable.  
 
Such advantages might be likened to chips in a casino. A player with the larger hoard of chips of 
course has advantages, as he can table large bets without imperiling himself and can readily move to 
other games to try again, including if he has lost. But a player is also advantaged if he has more types 
of chips, and ones that can be readily transferred to a new game. That is, a player who has $1, $5, 
$10, $20, $50, and $100 chips will be better off than one who just has $1 and $100 chips, especially if 
the latter player is low on chips. The former player can raise by $20 or $50 – still a considerable 
amount – while the latter player can only match it with $100 and may bankrupt himself in so doing. 
The first player’s chips are even more valuable if he can use them to play poker or blackjack or gin, 
while the other can only use his to play blackjack.  
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In this sort of situation, the upper hand will be his who can find escalatory equilibria of advantage 
that combine his capabilities and his will to maximize leverage. The combatant will have the 
advantage, in other words, who fields forces that can fight well and prevail within various plausible 
sets of boundaries and at the same time dissuade the adversary from counter-escalating from some 
of those sets. As always, strength and will are interrelated. The more strength – or, more precisely, 
strength, flexibility, and adaptability – one possesses, the less onerous will be the pressure on one’s 
resolve, and vice versa. But both will be necessary, particularly the farther the contest moves from 
existential interests, where pure resolve is more central. 
 
Strategy, it should be clear, will be vital in determining who is better positioned. Strategy – the 
efficient and deliberate creation and exploitation of advantages to achieve one’s aims – is obviously 
generally relevant. But the stronger one is and the less contingent one’s advantages, the more simple 
and straightforward one’s strategy can be and the less demanding its successful implementation will 
be. Thus Ulysses S. Grant’s approach to the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864-5 was direct but 
effective – to hold down Robert E. Lee’s army while the rest of the Federal forces tore apart the 
Southern interior, rendering Lee ultimately irrelevant. Grant never out and out defeated Lee in 
pitched battle; in fact he was defeated at the Wilderness and Cold Harbor. But his standard for 
success was lower.65 Likewise, the Allied assault on Fortress Europe in 1944-1945 was not 
particularly clever or exotic – indeed Western forces often got very hurt when they tried more artful 
maneuvers, such as with Operation Market Garden. Rather, the Allies leveraged their vastly greater 
strength to wear down the Germans through a broad front assault.66 
 
In a limited war between two opponents each with serious conventional forces and survivable 
nuclear arsenals, though, strategy is likely to be especially salient, because advantage will go to the 
side whose forces, plans, and doctrine are more suitable in such a context. A combatant who is 
stronger in overall terms but does not have the capabilities and plans to take advantage of ledges of 
advantage will therefore be unlikely to have and hold the edge, and decidedly will not if he is 
unprepared to trigger the kind of escalation that would ensue from activation of his overall margin.67 
Conversely, the advantage will go to the one with the better-matched posture and plans.  
 
To return to the Vietnam example, the United States was orders of magnitude more powerful than 
North Vietnam, but it lacked the strategy and capabilities required to sustainably force the resolute 
Communists into conceding – Hanoi was prepared to counterescalate to match and exceed 
Washington’s own escalations.68 Washington may have eventually been willing to expand the war 
into Cambodia and Laos and to launch more devastating bombing campaigns against the North, but 
Hanoi was willing and able to respond (even after a delay) with a counterescalation of its own that 
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the United States was unwilling to match, even though it could easily have destroyed the North as a 
functioning society.  
 
In the context of a limited war, then, the side will have the advantage that has the ability to move the 
contest to new “rule sets” and to take advantage of these new boundaries as well as the power to 
move the two combatants substantially but not too close to the edge. War termination in this 
situation, meanwhile, will not come about because of the vanquishing of one’s opponent. Instead, 
the (necessarily only partially) defeated side will decide, having been bested (at least in some material 
respect) within the current “rule set,” that counter-escalating is simply too dangerous, risky, or 
costly.  
 
This means that the side that has better adapted its capabilities, doctrine, and plans to what its 
preferred as well as the most likely boundaries of conflict would be, and – crucially – how those two 
dynamics interact will be better positioned, and perhaps immensely so.  
 
Practically Applying the Approach  
 
How would this work in practice? Let us take a concrete example of this problem of particular 
significance in the contemporary strategic environment that may help to elucidate the key themes.  
 
It is well understood that ejecting capable, entrenched forces is, all things being equal, more difficult 
and more demanding than resisting them.69 An invading, conquering force able to dig in, deploy its 
defensive shield (such as an A2/AD umbrella), and prepare for counteraction presents a more 
formidable challenge than one that has to attack a defended position, by necessity to a substantial 
degree in the open and moving and thus more exposed and vulnerable.70 Consequently, the ferocity, 
the extent, and the depth of the violence one needs to undertake to eject an entrenched force is 
generally going to be greater than that required to defend against such a force as it invades, and thus 
likewise it will be harder to control that violence and how it is perceived. Thus the effort required to 
eject such a force may well seem more escalatory than defending against it – more of a firm shove 
towards the precipice or a vigorous rocking of the boat, even if the counterattack is intended as 
liberation, or a sort of deferred defense.  
 
In the case of the Baltics, then, a Russian force able to dig in and deploy its sophisticated A2/AD 
bubble around the invading force would present a classic such challenge. So too would a Chinese 
force able to conquer Taiwan. In such eventualities, the scale of the effort needed to eject those 
forces would likely be considerably greater, more expansive, and fiercer – and thus would probably 
seem more aggressive to relevant observers and even to the parties themselves – than a direct 
defense of the Baltic states or Taiwan.71 If ejecting the invaders proved difficult, Washington might 
have to confront the choice of expanding or otherwise escalating the conflict in such a way that the 
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United States would seem the aggressor or the unreasonable escalator, fortifying the adversary’s 
threats to itself escalate more dramatically, including to the nuclear level, if they chose to do so and 
especially if the conflict turned unfavorably for them.72 In brief, Russia or China could compel the 
United States and its allies – fairly or not – to bear the onus of escalation. 
 
Accordingly, an effective strategy for the United States and its allies in such cases will need to be one 
that enables the United States to propose or adopt implicit or explicit “rule sets” that it can prevail 
within and thereby place the opponent in a losing position from which further escalation is too 
distasteful. It will need to be, in other words, an effective limited war – or, put another way, an 
escalation management and manipulation – strategy.  
 
An optimal strategy for such a contingency would have begun before conflict and even crisis, and 
would be designed to shape the nature of the struggle in ways favorable to the United States and its 
allies. For instance, it would seek to ensure that any Russian incursion into the Baltics or Chinese 
attack on Taiwan would have to be seen by any reasonable observer as clearly aggressive, brazen, 
and large-scale.  
 
Guaranteeing such a perception would augment the chances that public opinion in the United States 
and allied states – crucial in democracies especially – would be more supportive of resolute defense 
and more forward-leaning operational rules of engagement, as happened in the case of Japan’s attack 
on Pearl Harbor, and would also make third parties more likely to indirectly support the U.S. 
position or at least not condone such an assault by Russia or China. The views of third parties can 
be significant with respect to the imposition of sanctions and international support, but also by 
withholding support from the adversary. North Korea’s brazen attack across the border in 1950 
catalyzed a much larger and more significant international coalition to defend South Korea, with 
important political consequences; there continues to be a United Nations command in the Republic 
of Korea to this day. Iraq’s audacious seizure of Kuwait in 1990, meanwhile, did something similar 
and also prevented potentially sympathetic countries such as the Soviet Union and in the Arab world 
from providing support, diplomatic protection, and even armed support. To achieve similar effects 
in Eastern Europe the Alliance might, for instance, station additional forces in the Baltics, including 
close to the border, to ensure the Russians would have to barrel and cut through Allied defenders to 
penetrate NATO territory.  
 
Furthermore, to continue with the Baltic example, forces in the Baltics, elsewhere in Europe, and 
beyond would be postured and readied with a specific set of potential rules of engagement in mind. 
That is, U.S. and NATO forces tasked with defending NATO Eastern Europe would be prepared in 
advance with clear ideas of potential “rule sets” they could favorably operate within, based, naturally, 
on assessments of Russia’s capabilities and thus what would be necessary to prevail against Russian 
forces sufficiently to push the onus of dramatically escalating onto Moscow. So, for instance, the 
United States and NATO might plan to propose rules of engagement that would allow attacks on 
forces “directly implicated” in the conflict or, alternatively, on any military targets within a certain 
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distance of the Baltic states or the forward edge of the battle area. Such rule sets might be integrated 
among one another, for instance adding permission to attack certain types of forces (or only 
implicated such forces) beyond a primary geographic limit. U.S. proposals for such “rule sets” 
should be developed based on an intensive interaction among U.S. and allied military planners, 
policymakers, and diplomats who can interactively determine and evolve what limits are likely to be 
most favorable to the United States but yet also plausibly tolerable to an adversary and likely to be 
seen as reasonable and legitimate to relevant third parties.  
 
Based on these determinations, the United States and its allies should deliberately seek to shape 
perceptions of what is legitimate in terms of such rule sets, both in advance and in the midst of crisis 
and conflict. That is, the United States should consciously and actively seek to build support for the 
types of rules of engagement that it prefers and undermine the legitimacy of those that would favor 
its opponents. Obviously such perceptions are to a large degree outside the bounds of governmental 
influence, as they rest on deeper human or cultural perceptions of what is fair and legitimate.  
 
But they are nonetheless substantially subject to such influence. This is not least because modern 
military operations are highly technical and complex and often not intuitive. What is “fair” to 
someone who understands modern military operations may be quite different from someone who 
does not. For instance, sailors and space operators generally agree that a vessel or orbital asset 
approaching to close proximity to another is reasonably construed as dangerous and even hostile, 
both because of the chances of accident but also because ships and satellites are sufficiently fragile 
that they cannot afford to weather a first salvo in the way that entrenched ground forces often can. 
Thus the United States can shape perceptions of what is reasonable and legitimate in its favor by 
emphasizing the necessity of what it is preparing to do (broadly speaking, at least) due to reasonably 
understood military requirements.  
 
In addition to notional rules of engagement, the United States and its allies should also think about 
two additional vectors of limitation: plausible bases for war termination with the opponent and 
strategies for enforcement or escalation if the opponent refuses to comply or otherwise compels the 
United States to want to change the rules. That is, a limited war is not simply about limiting the 
means by which it is fought. It is as much about constraining the ends the combatants pursue. A war 
fought with limited means but for effectively unlimited aims is still very likely to seem unconstrained 
to at least one side.  
 
Thus the United States and its confederates also need to develop and be ready to propose bases or 
logics for ending the war on terms Russia or China would accept. Obviously these terms may change 
over the course of the conflict, both based on updated information and assessments as to the 
severity of the threat but also as ways of increasing or decreasing the pressure on the opponent. But 
the point is to have such proposed terms – or, better yet, logics – ready, and that these be integrated 
with the constraints the United States adopts in how it conducts the war. The absence of a 
reasonable, plausibly appealing basis for war termination can lead to frustration in a limited war. The 
failure of the United States to propose a basis for ending the war in Korea in the fall of 1950 to the 
major Communist powers and to restrain its military operations accordingly led to the intervention 









of the People’s Republic and the failure of the effort to reunify the Peninsula (or, more realistically, 
most of it) under “Free World” control.73 
 
At the same time, the United States will need also to consider how to respond advantageously in the 
highly anticipatable event that the adversary refuses to abide by the United States’ preferred “rule 
set,” either from the get-go or because it is losing under that framework. Indeed, being prepared for 
this eventuality is logically necessary, because the result of success within a given “rule set” is that 
the adversary will have a potent incentive to try to escalate out of it to a new ledge. Strategies to 
respond to such an attempt and, better yet, to deter such a counterescalation are vital to success in a 
limited war. That is, one needs a compelling way of persuading one’s opponent to stay in the 
proverbial headlock rather than try to break out of it.  
 
It is with respect to these strategies that the metaphorical ledge becomes so important. Victory in a 
limited war comes because the adversary decides that escalating himself out of defeat is just too 
dangerous, costly, or otherwise unpalatable. The jump, in simple terms, is too big and risky. It is too 
likely to lead to one – actually both – falling off the cliff. Successful U.S. strategies and postures in 
this vein should therefore force a Russia or China to have to escalate in very dramatic and 
unpredictable ways in order to favorably break the headlock they are in within the existing “rule set” 
of limited war. Indeed, this is the same formula for successful deterrence within a war as outside of 
it.  
 
In practical terms, then, the United States should shape its plans and capabilities to ensure that its 
forces are arrayed and prepared in ways that would force the opponent to have to escalate very 
greatly or in very risky ways in order to change the prevailing military dynamic. That is, forces 
defending the Baltic states or Taiwan should not only be able to effectively repel Russian or Chinese 
attack at certain levels of escalation but should be powerful, capable, well-postured, and the like 
enough such that Russia or China to would have to alter the “rule set” of war in a ways that are 
simply too radical and too perilous for their interests change the dynamic. A most effective such 
approach would, for instance, require Russia or China to have to take the war beyond the realm of 
conventional forces to the nuclear level in order to stave off defeat. Given the profound 
disincentives Moscow or Beijing would face to first nuclear use, especially in a situation in which its 
political claims were suspect or worse, this would be a tremendous burden. Moreover, the United 
States should have plans and capabilities to respond to any such nuclear escalation in ways that make 
it clear that Moscow or Beijing would be risking far too much and, at the very least, does not have 
the advantage if it continues in that vein. U.S. strategies in that context should be designed to induce 
the other side to return to compliance with the preferred U.S. “rule set” (or something like it) or to 
terminate the war on some plausible grounds sufficiently favorable to Washington.  
 
The novelty of this approach lies not in the argument that the United States should prepare potential 
rules of engagement for contingencies, but rather that everything from the building of plans to the 
development of capabilities should be constructed with the understanding that limitation of any war 
with Russia or China is very likely to happen, that the United States should actively seek to influence 
what those limits should be, and, more broadly, that the competition over rule sets is likely to be 
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important and quite possibly central to determining who prevails in such a conflict. That is, the need 
to prepare for and exploit the limitation of conflict should be something built in to everything from 
plans to platforms from the beginning, not an add-on or afterthought.  
 
Of course, such preparations should not be too rigid or set in stone. Effectively conducting a limited 
war means satisfactorily correlating the intensity, violence, and scope of a conflict as well as the 
political aims sought with the gravity of the stakes involved and the military requirements of 
overcoming the adversary. Yet these criteria will necessarily vary based on the nature of the 
contingency.  
 
For instance, how much a combatant is prepared to venture and how much it will seek to achieve 
will depend on its perceptions of the value and importance of its stakes in the struggle, which will in 
turn depend on factors such as the behavior and apparent intent and power of the other side, the 
broader international situation, the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of war, and a myriad 
host of other factors, including even the personalities of national leaders. An essentially unprovoked 
PRC invasion of Taiwan, for instance, would represent a different and more brazen challenge to 
U.S. interests than a Chinese blockade of the island in the aftermath of an attempt by Taipei to 
declare independence. Both might lead to U.S. military intervention, but the nature, scope, ferocity, 
and ambition of those interventions would likely be dramatically different, and thus too would 
Washington’s preferred boundaries of limitation.  
 
In addition, judgments as to preferred boundaries of war limitation will also depend on the military 
demands of fighting an opponent over a particular stake. These judgments will in turn derive from 
assessments of the relative military capabilities of the two sides regarding the place or area at issue, 
assessments that will turn not only on general analyses of the overall military balance between the 
two parties but also on their relative capabilities with respect to the particular contingency at hand. A 
conflict over Taiwan, for which the PLA is well-prepared, would present a quite different military 
problem for the United States than a struggle stemming from a dispute over islands in the South or 
East China Seas, for which the PLA is currently less well-equipped.74 Thus, since a contest with 
China over Taiwan would be considerably more demanding for the United States than one over the 
Spratly or Senkaku Islands, U.S. preferred parameters for limitation for a war over the former might 
well be different – and presumably broader and more permissive – than for the latter.  
 
A procrustean approach to preparing to limit a conflict therefore risks being maladjusted to the 
particularities of a given war, with potentially grave consequences. A strategy or plan assuming too 
permissive a set of boundaries or too ambitious a set of goals risks U.S. political leaders balking in 
the moment of decision. Conversely, one that is too restrictive and modest in its goals courts defeat 
at the hands of an opponent capable of prevailing under such conditions and willing to take the risks 
necessary to do so. The United States therefore needs to be able to adapt its military strategy and 
plans in this way against China and Russia to the particular contingency that emerges. 
 
                                       
74 See “Scorecard 2: Air Campaigns Over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands,” The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, 
Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1997-2017, 71-95. 









But that does not counsel unpreparedness or waiting until the outbreak of conflict before planning. 
Such inaction would naturally be foolhardy, since military success depends on a high degree of 
planning and preparation. Moreover, much of the crucial framing of what is legitimate regarding 
boundaries of limitation is likely to happen before a conflict. Thus, this need for flexibility means 
having ready a set of different plans and processes for favorably limiting a conflict based on the 
stakes and military balance over the particular issue, plans and processes that are tailored to 
especially plausible scenarios and that can be adapted to given contingencies, as well as a posture 
that can enable implementation of the range of those plans. In addition, it means a political and 
diplomatic strategy that positively shapes and influences the international perceptual environment to 
enable and support U.S. war plans.  
 
Given that Moscow and Beijing would each have abundant reason to want to limit any such war 
with the United States and its allies and partners, shifting the burden of deepening or expanding a 
conflict onto them would be a very significant strategic gain. Nor would such factors constraining 
them be confined to perhaps dispensable considerations of international reputation and prestige, for 
the United States’ own reserve capabilities to counter such escalation—including, in the extreme 
case, its nuclear forces—would form a powerful deterrent against the opponent seeking to escalate 
its way out of defeat, especially given that such employment would seem more legitimate and more 





A war between the United States and Russia or China would be extraordinarily dangerous, risky, and 
in itself represent a disaster. It could, moreover, possibly escalate to a major nuclear exchange, which 
could result in the most horrifying devastation. Nonetheless, the United States must prepare for 
such an eventuality, not out of bellicosity or ambition but precisely the opposite – out of a desire for 
a satisfactory peace.  
 
We know that countries are prepared to push, coerce, and even attack under the shadow of nuclear 
weapons. Because the use of nuclear weapons is so terrifying and, in a situation of mutual 
vulnerability, because people understand that nuclear use can really never be deemed a certainty, 
nuclear weapons do not kill strategic or strategic behavior – rather they chill and shape it. Countries 
may therefore judge that embarking on aggression against others is reasonable, even if they are the 
beneficiaries of the protection of a nuclear umbrella – and, indeed, we must admit that such 
calculations are not in se irrational.  
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Thus, left without a credible and effective response to Russian or Chinese aggressiveness, the United 
States and its allies would open themselves to rational coercion or assault by Moscow or Beijing, and 
thus court the very thing they hope to avert. In order to stave off this outcome, it is incumbent upon 
Washington and its allies to prepare – and prepare well – to fight and prevail over Moscow or 
Beijing in the event they use force against the United States’ vital interests, including its allies. This 
study is offered as a preliminary step in developing a logic for how the United States can do so in the 
face of potential opponents possessed of increasingly formidable conventional militaries and 
survivable nuclear forces.  
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
This study has laid out a statement of the intensifying problem facing the United States as well as a 
proposal for how the United States might go about preparing to effectively fight and prevail in a 
limited war. Much remains to be thought through and done, however, that is beyond the scope of 
this report.  
 
Key questions and issues requiring further analysis include:  
 
• What are the historical roots and antecedents of limited war? What can the historical record 
tell us? 
• What are the potential means of limiting a war? How can they be conceptualized, organized, 
and ultimately employed in service of the goal of an effective limited war strategy? What are 
their respective merits and demerits, and under what circumstances might they be suitable or 
unsuitable? 
• What are the potential approaches to war termination, which is a vital component of a 
limited war since such a conflict must by definition must end by the mutual consent of the 
combatants? 
• What are strategies for establishing preferred “rules” of limitation? That is, what are plausible 
“rule sets” for a limited war? What are their plusses and minuses? 
• What are strategies for enforcement of violations of such preferred sets or for coercing an 
opponent to terminate a war? That is, what are strategies of deliberate escalation and 
counterescalation? What are their respective merits and demerits?  
• What are particular steps for the United States that are likely to be advantageous based on 
this analysis? Are there implications for U.S. strategy? Capabilities? Doctrine? What are 
implications for U.S. allies and partners?  
• What are the implications for arms control and stability measures with both Russia and 






































In a chapter examining China’s thinking on escalation, the authors of  a comprehensive 2008 RAND 
study of  escalation management in the 21st century, came to the stark, and since widely-cited, 
conclusion that Chinese authoritative writings on escalation and escalation management through 
2005 appeared “to be undertheorized and still under development.”1 The authors arrived at their 
judgment after examining three broad categories of  People’s Liberation Army (PLA) writings in 
which they found only limited research devoted to analyzing the general issue of  escalation in 
warfare and even less focused on the more specific issue of  the effect of  PLA doctrine on the risks 
of  inadvertent or accidental escalation. They did note, however, that interest in these topics “appears 
to be growing” in the Chinese military and observed that more writings on escalation and escalation 
control “may appear in the coming years.”2 A 2006 analysis of  Chinese concepts in escalation 
management conducted by Lonnie Henley, then Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and 
Pacific for the Defense Intelligence Agency, arrived at similar conclusions, including the observation 
that Chinese military writers were still in the early stages of  considering how to manage the 
unwanted escalation of  a crisis or conflict and the prediction that further development of  such 
concepts could be expected over the next decade.3  
  
The current understanding of  Chinese thought on escalation among American scholars and 
practitioners alike has largely been based upon the RAND and Henley studies together with a 2006 
edited volume of  American and Chinese case studies on the management of  Sino-American crises.4 
However, two studies authored by U.S. Sinologists that appeared in early 2016 are likely to revise and 
further refine our current understanding. The first, a study on the evolution of  Chinese crisis 
management theory authored by Alastair Iain Johnston of  Harvard5 and the second, a study on 
recent Chinese military writings on escalation control co-authored by Alison Kaufman and David 
Hartnett of  the CNA Corporation,6 are based on Chinese writings that have appeared since the 
middle of  the first decade of  the 2000s; as such they constitute important, if  not overdue, appraisals 
                                       
* Burgess Laird is a Senior International Affairs Analyst with the RAND Corporation 
1 Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Roger Cliff, Dangerous Thresholds: Managing 
Escalation in the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 49. 
2 Morgan et al., pp. 48 and 51.  
3 Lonnie D. Henley, “War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management,” in Shaping China’s Security Environment: 
The Role of the People’s Liberation Army, Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 2006, pp. 81-103. Henceforth, cited as Henley 2006. Also see Lonnie D. Henley, "Evolving 
Chinese Concepts of War Control and Escalation Management" in Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s 
Security, Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Evan S. Medeiros, with Oriana Skylar Mastro, eds., Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2007, pp. 85-110. Henceforth, cited as Henley 2007.  
4 See Alison A. Kaufman and Daniel Hartnett, Managing Conflict: Examining Recent PLA Writings on Escalation Control, 
Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016, p. 1. The edited volume referenced is that of Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., 
Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2006.  
5 Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory and Practice in China,” Naval 
War College Review, Winter 2016, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 29-71. Interestingly, just as the books discussed to this point, 
including the book co-edited by Swaine and Tuosheng, have helped form the U.S. understanding of Chinese thought on 
escalation, Johnston reports that his research finds that the Swaine and Tuosheng volume “has had an important impact 
on crisis-management research in China.” Johnston, p. 33. 
6 Kaufman and Hartnett, Managing Conflict. 
 








that promise to add to the U.S. appreciation of  Chinese views on escalation.  
 
How Chinese military strategists think about the issue of  escalation has only taken on added 
importance, if  not urgency, in the eight years that have elapsed since the RAND study. To wit, the 
possibility of  military crises and confrontations with China has increased and continues to do so as 
China’s ambitions, interests, and capabilities grow. Continued advancements in the capabilities of  the 
PLA conventional and nuclear forces and in the associated doctrine and operating approaches that 
condition their use in crisis and conflict raise concerns about the possibility of  unwanted escalation. 
PLA developments in capabilities and doctrine for the domains of  space and cyberspace raise 
similarly pronounced and novel concerns as military operations in both of  those domains present 
additional and not fully understood avenues of  unwanted escalation. That a Sino-U.S. crisis, let alone 
conflict, would play out under the nuclear shadow should be lost on no one.  
 
Questions of  particular salience to U.S. strategists and decision makers include: How do recent 
Chinese military writings describe escalation and the processes and actions by which it might occur 
in crisis or in war? What do Chinese strategists say about escalation prevention and control, their 
importance, and the challenges of  implementing them? What do PLA analysts say about crises and 
conflict between nuclear powers and the necessity of  limited means in the pursuit of  limited political 
and military objectives in the latter; in short, what do they say about the concept of  limited war? In 
contrast to the Chinese military texts from the first five to eight years of  this century, do the more 
recent writings reflect a greater understanding – do they even acknowledge – that actions taken to 
deter an adversary can lead inadvertently to escalation? What do these PLA strategists say about 
thresholds and redlines, and about communications between parties in time of  crisis and war? 
Finally, what do authoritative texts say about escalation risks and challenges associated with the new 
and rapidly changing operational domains of  space and cyberspace? In short, how are Chinese 
strategists accounting for escalation and limited war in their authoritative writings post-2010? Do 
their arguments and concepts remain “undertheorized”? 
  








PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The purpose of  this examination is to review authoritative PLA writings on escalation that have 
appeared since approximately 2008 with the objective of  highlighting select aspects of  Chinese 
thought that have evolved over that period of  time as well as those that have remained relatively 
unchanged. In both instances, the aspects selected for discussion are those the author believes hold 
special salience for U.S. defense strategists, planners, and decision makers – those aspects that, in 
other words, help illuminate how Chinese strategists are thinking about the questions outlined above.  
 
Chinese authoritative literature is generally understood to encompass the writings of  PLA strategists 
and officers, active and retired, published by the Chinese government’s highly respected institutions 
such as the Academy of  Military Sciences (AMS) and the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU) 
or are otherwise found in respected professional military journals such as China Military Science. As 
the 2008 RAND study observed, such writings are generally considered authoritative in the sense that 
many, if  not most, are produced as teaching materials for use in educating PLA officers about 
various aspects of  joint operations doctrine. At the same time, such writings cannot necessarily be 
considered definitive for the straightforward reason that while they reflect beliefs, principles, and 
concepts held by Chinese strategists and officers, other classified PLA contingency plans and war 
plans not generally available to Western analysts “presumably reveal, in far greater detail, specific 
PLA operations and, thus, the PLA’s relative propensity for escalation.”7  
 
This examination is distinct from the both the Kaufman and Hartnett study and the Johnston study 
in three respects. First, unlike both of  those studies, this examination is not the product of  a 
Sinologist, but instead that of  a U.S. defense strategist and force planner, who does not speak or 
read Mandarin, but who nonetheless spends significant time studying and analyzing China’s military.8 
Second, although this examination, like the Kaufman and Hartnett study, focuses upon Chinese 
authoritative writings, it is not as comprehensive in its scope as their study, but as discussed above, is 
instead designed to focus only on select aspects of  recent Chinese writings on escalation that the 
author believes are of  special relevance to U.S. defense strategists, planners, and decision makers. 
Finally, this examination’s exclusive focus on Chinese thought on escalation as reflected in the 
authoritative literature distinguishes it from the wide-ranging Johnston study which encompasses not 
only the development of  crisis management theory in China, but also the institutional development 
of  crisis management research and problems in China’s crisis-management practice as well as its 
crisis decision making and response.  
 
There are, of  course, advantages and disadvantages in consulting China’s authoritative thought to 
the exclusion of  the writings of  its academic and scholarly communities. On the one hand, the 
author hopes to understand the thinking and views of  those who make decisions about strategy and 
doctrine, operations, and investments instead of  focusing on the thinking of  Chinese scholars – 
however serious and thoughtful – whose views typically have little bearing on or connection to 
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Chinese military officials.9 On the other hand, it is necessary to concede that accounts that rely too 
heavily upon authoritative sources for a representative take on Chinese views of  escalation may well 
be asking too much of  the official literature. It is entirely plausible, after all, that Chinese strategists, 
like their American counterparts, would be concerned about the potential for such discussions to 
reveal actual or perceived vulnerabilities as well as areas of  uncertainty and internal disagreement.10  
 
It is important to note one perennial characteristic of  Chinese writings on escalation that has not 
appreciably evolved over time. This is the fact that Chinese strategists seldom actually write about 
the concept of  escalation or associated concepts such as escalation control and escalation 
management themselves. Instead they write about escalation in terms of  the Chinese concepts of  
the containment and control of  crisis, “containment of  war” (ezhi zhanzheng) and “war control” 
(zhanzheng kongzhi), a broad concept that encompasses control of  armed conflict in all its phases.11 
And finally, Chinese strategists address the matter of  escalation in their writings about deterrence, 
the main objectives of  which include deterring key-major military crises, effectively containing war, 
deterring the eruption of wars, curbing warfare escalation, and avoiding or reducing warfare 
damage.12 
 
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS  
 
From this examination, eight notable findings about current Chinese thinking on escalation emerge. 
Specifically:  
 
1. That the issues of  crisis control and war control are of  major importance to the Chinese 
military; 
2. The belief  that crises and wars need to be controlled, not out of  concern that they could 
escalate to major war involving nuclear weapons use resulting in catastrophic destruction, 
but primarily out of  a concern that an uncontrolled local war could derail China’s economy 
and in doing so foster widespread domestic discontent and instability that would threaten the 
legitimacy, if  not the ruling position itself, of  the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); this 
                                       
9 In fact, what is more often encountered in examinations reporting on Chinese scholarly views of military and broader 
security issues is, not to place too fine a gloss on the situation, a variant of recycled Western scholarly bathwater. Thus, 
this author, at least, often leaves such pieces not so much persuaded that the argument advanced is an accurate reflection 
of the current state of thinking of PLA strategists, let alone senior Chinese decision makers, as it is a reflection of a close 
acquaintance with the ongoing discussion and debate within the Western scholarly community.  
10 For perspective, consider the difficulty of pointing to U.S. official writings containing anything approaching an open 
and direct exploration of, for instance, the difficulty of compelling an adversary to stop fighting while simultaneously 
demonstrating restraint in U.S. goals and military objectives. Nonetheless, recent debates within the U.S. Congress and 
between the Congress and the Executive Branch concerning the Reliable Replacement Warhead and a conventional 
version of the Trident D5, and more recently the wisdom of the Air Sea Battle concept, all reflect a degree of 
transparency and openness in the U.S. discussion of even the most sensitive matters that simply does not exist in and 
could not take place in China.  
11 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy (English-language edition), Beijing: Military 
Science Publishing House, 2005, p. 213. Henceforth cited as SMS 2005. That this is a still unchanging characteristic of 
Chinese thought on escalation is reflected in the fact that Henley highlighted the characteristic about the Chinese 
authoritative literature released through the 2005 timeframe. See Henley, p. 82. 
12 Shou Xiaosong, ed., The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlue Zue), 3rd ed., Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013, p. 119. 
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belief  would appear to lend greater weight to the possible political-military effectiveness of  
plausible U.S. operational concepts, such as offshore control, which aim to defeat Chinese 
war objectives (in postulated scenarios) by threatening the key energy and commercial 
lifelines upon which the country depends;  
3. The enduring belief, as it can be seen in recent Chinese military writings as well as those of  
the 2000-2006 period, that war can be controlled if  only the correct processes and principles 
are followed, and the newer contention that advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; command and control (C2) capabilities; and in precision 
weapons provide commanders with an even greater ability to control war at the operational 
and tactical levels;  
4. The conspicuous, and enduring, absence of  any discussion of  the different mechanisms by 
which crises and conflicts escalate; in short, Chinese strategists continue to write about 
escalation without distinguishing between deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental escalation; 
5. A continued failure to offer any discussion of  potential escalation risks arising from Chinese 
military principles, doctrines, or concepts advanced as critical to crisis and war control, 
including the concept of  seizing the initiative, a belief  that crises should be seen and 
exploited as windows of  opportunity, and a potential unwillingness to initiate and maintain 
communications with an adversary in crises involving territorial and sovereignty issues;  
6. Continued silence regarding the importance of  thresholds and red lines in either crisis or 
conflict and therefore no examination of  the types of  actions that could constitute the 
crossing of  them or of  the possibility that an adversary might see Chinese actions 
themselves as having crossed key thresholds or red lines; 
7. The belief  that offensive cyberspace and counter-space operations are not only advisable 
early in a war with a major adversary, but that they can be undertaken at a comparatively low 
risk of  escalation; the similar belief  that in both crisis and war offensive cyberspace operations 
can be carried out against civilian and military targets without causing the adversary to 
escalate; both are very high-risk beliefs on the part of  Chinese strategists that are tantamount 
to an extension of  the concept of  seizing the initiative into the realms of  space and 
cyberspace operations; 
8. The continued failure of  Chinese writings on nuclear deterrence to recognize that the 
deterrent signaling actions called for by the concept of  “inexorable momentum” could result 
in an adversary response precisely the opposite of  what the concept promises, and a neglect 
to identify the escalation risks associated with China’s potential adoption of  a launch-on-
warning policy for its nuclear missile forces.  
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
The remaining sections of  this examination are organized as follows. The first subject examined is 
the Chinese concept of  limited war, to include its origin and the ultimately pragmatic reasons the 
PLA is given the mission of  ensuring that the scale, scope, means, and objectives of  wars are to be 








carefully limited. The study then turns to an examination of  the Chinese concepts of  the 
containment and control of  crises, and discusses how the PLA sees the control of  both crises and 
wars as imperative lest they escalate to a point that threatens to derail China’s national economic 
development. Next, the study considers the Chinese concept of  war control highlighting three 
principles related to that concept which, instead of  preventing crises and conflicts from escalating 
uncontrollably, could well provoke precisely the opposite outcome. The examination then turns to a 
look at what Chinese strategists are saying about the relatively new and dynamic domains of  military 
cyberspace and space operations. Finally, the study examines nuclear deterrence, emphasizing two 
issues that raise escalation risk concerns. The examination concludes with a summary of  the main 




We begin by examining Chinese views on limited war, a concept widely recognized by Western 
strategists as the imperative bounding condition of  conflict in an age in which all wars between 
major powers inexorably take place under the nuclear shadow and each of  which, for a variety of  
reasons and actions not always fully understood and still less under our control, could escalate into total wars 
with catastrophic and existential consequences for entire nation states. Chinese strategists trace the 
origin of  the concept and reality of  limited war in the modern era to the advent of  nuclear weapons 
and the ensuing Cold War. In doing so they suggest that local wars and limited wars are virtually 
synonymous. In an early section of  the most recent version of  the Science of  Military Strategy, the only 
section in the text that addresses limited war itself, the authors write:  
 
Nuclear weapons' ultimate destructive effect placed human society's war goal and 
war means in extremely great contradiction. And the limitlessness of  the destructive 
might of  the weapons, in turn, demanded an explicit restriction on the political goal 
of  war, so as to avoid the limitlessness of  the war's political goal to bring the 
disasters of  a nuclear great war. After a nuclear balance of  terror was achieved 
through a nuclear arms race, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were forced to face [the 
fact that] a nuclear great war yields no winner and would cause the harsh reality of  
‘nuclear winter,’ so they had to make a new strategic choice to actively control the 
strategic impulse of  using nuclear weapons and to rely on fighting limited wars or 
local wars (youxian zhanzheng huo jubu zhanzheng) against the backdrop of  nuclear 
deterrence to achieve a limited war political goal.13  
 
According to the Science of  Military Strategy, in local war under future informationized conditions, 
strict control of  the goals and means of  war is necessary to ensure that the wars that do occur do 
not threaten national survival, do not cause fundamental harm to the national economic entities, and 
do not threaten the realization of  the strategic objectives of  national development. From this, the 
authors argue that the “goals of  local war are specifically expressed as limited political goals, limited 
military goals, and limited economic goals” and commanders are therefore urged to,  
 
… not overdo the degree of  force in war, and not take as primary threatening of  the 
adversary's survival and comprehensive stripping away of  the adversary's military 
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capability, but rather take forcing the adversary to come to terms as primary; see that 
the size of  the operational scope is moderate, and not try to cover the entire space 
of  the enemy and friendly sides’ homelands, but rather limit the scope to within a 
certain area (zone); ensure that the strike objectives are distinguished by relative 
importance… but not focusing on civilian targets …14 
 
Two characteristics are notable about these passages on the origins and imperatives of  the modern 
notion of  limited war. The first is that Chinese analysts do in fact trace the origins of  the idea of  
limited war as well as the imperatives of  limiting the political, military, and economic goals of  such 
war to the immense destructive power of  nuclear weapons. Western students of  limited war theory 
in the post-World War II era would find little substantive discrepancy between the selected passages 
from the Science of  Military Strategy and the ideas and imperatives advanced by leading Western 
analysts and scholars of  the subject.15 That the stakes entailed in thinking through and attending 
seriously to the concept of  limitations came down to nothing less than the question of  national 
survival would similarly be so widely shared among most Western strategists as to not merit stating.  
 
The second and more striking point to be made about these passages is that they constitute the only 
discussions in the entirety of  the Science of  Military Strategy that logically and explicitly associate the 
imperative of  limited war goals to the specter of  nuclear warfare and thus to the issue of  national 
survival itself, an issue almost existential in its scope. Throughout the remainder of  the Science of  
Military Strategy and throughout the entirety of  the other authoritative Chinese writings reviewed in 
the course of  this analysis, only one mentions limited war16 and none acknowledge how limited or 
local wars could escalate to nuclear conflict, let alone address the imperative of  limiting wars and 
crises as a matter of  national survival.17 Instead, the argument – encountered repeatedly – is that 
local wars and crises alike should be controlled lest they derail the nation’s development goals in the period 
of  strategic opportunity.  
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15 A small, but representative sampling of such analysts and scholars and their germane work would include, Henry 
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957; Morton Halperin, Limited War in the 
Nuclear Age, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963; Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961; Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965; and of course, both Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957 and Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 
1979. 
16 Wang Xixin, “Further Discussion on War of Control” (Zai lun kongzhi zhan), China Military Science (Zhongguo Junshi 
Kexue), August 2014. 
17 The 2012 version of the China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia does contain a brief entry on “Local wars under nuclear 
deterrence conditions,” which it defines as “When a local conventional war occurs between two nuclear nations or a 
local conventional war occurs between one nuclear and one non-nuclear nation, the conflict bears the characteristics and 
role of nuclear deterrence … After World War II and since the outbreak of the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the 
fourth Middle Eastern War, local wars occur under nuclear deterrence conditions.” China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia 
(Zhongguo zhanlue daodan budui baike quanshu), 2012. The concept is similar to what Western thinkers refer to as “conflict 
under the nuclear shadow.” By this understanding, then, all local wars under conditions of informatization that involve a 
nuclear power are also local wars under nuclear deterrent conditions. A question arises: Does this seemingly obvious 
connection provide additional motive for the Chinese to control the political and military objectives as well as the 
military means of war? The answer is not obvious from recent authoritative writings. 








The injunction that the PLA should not take actions that would jeopardize the “nation’s 
development goals in the period of strategic opportunity” is one that strongly resonates with 
Chinese strategists as it purposefully recalls the second of the four “new historic missions” that 
former General Secretary of the CCP and the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Hu 
Jintao presented to the PLA in December 2004. The second historic mission calls upon the PLA to 
“provide a powerful security guarantee for safeguarding the important Strategic Opportunity Period 
of national development” and in doing so it tasks the military with preventing domestic or 
international disruptions to China’s pursuit of further economic development in particular “during 
the first two decades of the 21st century,” a span of time that Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, 
designated as China’s “Strategic Opportunity Period.”18 Importantly, for Jiang and Hu, the period is 
one of “strategic opportunity” for China because it is one in which the international situation is 
expected to continue to be peaceful, the likelihood of great power conflict low, the world moving 
toward multipolarization and globalization, and China’s economy growing and thus benefitting 
China’s populace.19 According to this view, major war involving the use of  nuclear weapons, i.e. total 
war, is no longer likely given international conditions, and therefore, attention and planning should 
prioritize preparation for deterring and conducting local war under informationized conditions. 
Chinese strategists tend to view the disappearance of  large-scale total war almost as if  it were a 
historically determined inevitability. As Liu Shenyang writes: “Large scale war and weapons of mass 
destruction are gradually exiting the stage of history because massive destruction is incompatible 
with modern civilization.”20 Thus the repeated imperative to ensure that crises and wars not threaten 
the nation’s development goals during the period of strategic opportunity also constitutes an 
acceptance of the assumption that the period is one of relative international peace and in which the 
possibility of great power conflict is low. And it is upon this assumption, it must be emphasized, that 
Chinese strategists have erected much of their understanding of the imperatives of crisis and war 
control.  
 
The Chinese preoccupation with preventing or avoiding the harm that uncontrolled crises and 
conflicts could cause to the nation’s development goals is a fundamentally pragmatic, if  not well-
grounded, concern,21 and one, therefore, that stands in stark contrast to the ultimate Western 
motivation for the attention given to managing crises involving other major states possessing nuclear 
                                       
18 For an excellent discussion, see Daniel M. Hartnett, “The ‘New Historic Missions’: Reflections on Hu Jintao’s Military 
Legacy, Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Tavis Tanner, eds., pp. 
31-81. 
19 See Hartnett, p. 43.  
20 See Liu Shenyang, “On War of Control – Mainly from Military Thinking Perspective,” China Military Science (Zhongguo 
junshi kexue) 2014. 
21 The authors of a recent RAND report find that while a conventional war between China and the United States would 
result in immense economic costs for both countries – costs that would include the contraction of trade, consumption, 
and revenue from investments abroad – the harm done to China’s economy would be far greater because of key 
structural asymmetries that distinguish the two. The authors estimate that after one year of severe war, U.S. GDP could 
decline between 5 to 10 percent, while China’s GDP could decline by an enormous 25 to 35 percent. Significantly, for 
the upcoming discussion of the operational strategy of “Offshore Control,” the estimated 25-35 percent impact found in 
the RAND report does not include the costs that would result from U.S. deliberate efforts to disrupt China’s energy 
supplies. Even absent such a strategy, what the RAND analysts characterize as a “war zone effect” could be expected to 
dramatically disrupt sea-borne trade in all goods in the Western Pacific during a Sino-U.S. war. See David C. Gompert, 
Astrid Stuth Cavallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable, Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2016, esp. pp. 41-50. 








arsenals: the concern that such crises or conflicts might escalate – inadvertently, accidentally, or less 
likely, deliberately – to a point at which they pose a threat to the nation’s very existence.22  
 
But there is an even more fundamental factor still that helps explain why Chinese strategists place 
such a major emphasis upon preventing crises and war from escalating to the point that they derail 
China’s efforts to achieve its national economic development goals. It is the straightforward 
recognition on the part of  China’s leaders, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, that the legitimacy 
and authority of  the CCP is inextricably tied to its ability to deliver high economic growth year in 
and year out. Deng was the first to recognize that as goes China’s economy, so goes the people’s 
patience in continuing to put up with a party whose avowed Marxist ideology no longer enjoys any 
support among the great majority of  the Chinese people. In brief, Chinese leaders harbor a deep 
concern – well-grounded in China’s long history – that a major contraction in the economy would 
spur widespread domestic instability and discontent that could threaten the legitimacy if  not the 
ruling position of  the CCP itself. Seen through a Western lens it may appear only self-evident that 
the PLA should seek to control crises and wars so that they do not derail China’s economic growth, 
but in the end, the PLA, the army of  the CCP, must control crises and wars so that they do not place 
the ruling CCP in jeopardy.  
 
The belief  that crises and wars need to be controlled lest an uncontrolled local war derail China 
from achieving its national economic development objectives and with it spell the end of  the CCP 
would seem to hold important implications for U.S. strategy and planning. In particular, it would 
seem to lend greater weight to the arguments advanced by advocates of  offshore control concepts,23 
who maintain that holding China’s energy lifelines through the Straits of  Malacca at risk is a less 
risky and more effective operational approach than the scale and scope of  mainland strikes entailed 
in (some public accounts of) operational concepts like Air-Sea Battle.24 One of  the principal 
criticisms of  offshore control concepts is that they would prove ineffective in compelling China to 
stop its aggression, as they would take too long to exact significant costs on China.25 But if  in fact 
                                       
22 To be clear, while pragmatic concerns with the damage done to the economic health of the country would not be and, 
since the dawn of the nuclear age, have never been out of place in the U.S. discussion of the importance of managing the 
potential escalation of crises and conflict, such concerns have seldom served as the primary motivating factor underlying 
the discussion. Perhaps the only significant single exception would be the discussion among the relatively small 
community of planners and targeteers at Strategic Air Command during the height of the Cold War in the late-1950s 
through mid-1960s who put great effort into elaborate if macabre calculations to determine what percentage of the 
adversary’s industrial capacity could and should be destroyed to secure victory should war with the Soviet Union break 
out. 
23 For example, T.X. Hammes advances the idea of a distant blockade entailing the establishment of a set of concentric 
rings to deny China the use of the sea within the first island chain with the maritime and airspace of outer rings 
dominated by U.S. and allied forces working to ensure that energy supplies and other key commercial traffic bound for 
China does not proceed to China. See T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Strategic 
Forum, No. 278, Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, June 2012.  
24 Now officially referred to as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). 
25 Other criticisms of the offshore control concept include the arguments that it would (a) divert military forces needed 
to prosecute operations in the main area of operations (typically the assumed scenario posits Chinese aggression directed 
against Taiwan or Japan, or one or more of China’s neighbors over a contested territory in the South China Sea), (b) 
exact costs on the Chinese civilian populace and thus cause broader collateral damage and suffering than precision 
strikes against select mainland targets, and (c) likely be interpreted by U.S. allies in the Asian Pacific and elsewhere as an 
insufficient and arms-length demonstration of U.S. security commitments to an ally under attack, thus threatening to 
undercut the strength of U.S. alliances worldwide. For a criticism of the offshore control concept and a defense of 








Beijing’s key concern is to stay on course to keep its economy humming, perhaps a better way to 
respond to Chinese military aggression is not to fight them at the same game they have started 
(whether over Taiwan or the Spratlys or even the Senkakus) but to respond in an indirect way that 
effectively lets China know that their national economic development objectives are now going to be 
significantly derailed, this is going to occur without dropping even one bomb on Chinese soil, and it 
will be in effect every day until China’s aggression ceases.  
 
 
CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL OF CRISES 
 
Chinese writers recognize containment and control of  crises as critical aspects of  military strategy 
that function to prevent small crises from escalating into larger crises and large crises from escalating 
into wars.26 Crisis is described as being a “dangerous condition for possibly igniting wars” that exists 
“between peace and war.”27 PLA analysts see the likelihood of  crises as increasing and warn that 
they must be controlled lest they jeopardize the “nation’s development in the period of  strategic 
opportunity.” Observing that “the frequency of  the eruption of  wars has shown a downward trend 
but the frequency of  the eruption of  crises has shown an upward trend,” the authors of  the latest 
edition of  the Science of  Military Strategy reason that “it is both a period of  strategic opportunity and a 
period of  strategic risk” in which China “will unavoidably face various categories of  complex and 
changing crisis events.” They go on to warn that if  the crises are not appropriately handled, they 
could “create serious interruptions and damage to the nation’s development and the security grand 
situation, and even influence the nation's rise and the course of  history.”28 
 
Chinese authoritative writings, in other words, acknowledge that absent control, lesser crises can 
escalate into more consequential and expansive crises. They thus insist that great effort will be 
necessary to avoid economic and social crises from escalating into political crises, international crises 
from evolving into domestic crises, and non-military crises from transforming into military crises.29 
The 2015 Defense White Paper similarly states that the PLA will “work to effectively control major 
crises, properly handle possible chain reactions, and firmly safeguard the country’s territorial 
sovereignty and security.”30 Importantly, however, even while acknowledging that crises can and do 
escalate in a chain reaction-like manner, Chinese strategists do not identify, let alone discuss or 
provide examples of, the kinds of  activities that PLA commanders should avoid undertaking as they 
could trigger the unwanted escalation of  crises. In short, recent Chinese authoritative writings on 
crisis escalation are just as silent on the matter of  distinguishing between deliberate and inadvertent 
mechanisms of  escalation as the Chinese authoritative writings that appeared in the 2000 to 2006 
period.31 
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PLA strategists advance a concept of  “quasi-war” to refer to major crises in which militaries 
confront one another, undertaking shows of  force and other operations that in U.S. joint doctrine 
would be categorized as military Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).32 Such quasi-wars may even 
involve “combat activities of  some intensity,” but cannot yet be considered outright war. As Chinese 
writers explain, in such “quasi-wars,” the military has two goals: to prevent the crisis from escalating 
into war by creating “the conditions for a political solution,” while simultaneously preparing the 
battlefield should war erupt.33 As LTG Wang Xixin, deputy commander of  the Shenyang Military 
Region, argues in the journal China Military Science,  
 
Conflict control during crisis times … is aimed at avoiding wars. … Once a crisis 
occurs, the first thing is to respond quickly to show the principle [sic] stance [of  
avoiding wars] and strive for strategic initiative, expanding diplomatic efforts, public 
opinion and propaganda in order to convey specific and clear information and advice 
to the other side, and to increase mutual understanding and enhance trust. At the 
same time, [commanders must] actively carry out internal preparations for addressing 
a contingency, including adjusting military deployments and military deterrence, and 
completing dual preparations for negotiating a resolution and for dealing with a 
random contingency.34 
 
In advancing this argument, Chinese writings on military crises neglect to account for the challenges 
inherent in meeting the dual objectives of  preventing a crisis from escalating into war while 
simultaneously preparing the battlefield should war erupt, how these objectives might be in 
fundamental tension with one another, and thus the possibility that activities to prepare the 
battlefield for war could, in fact, not deter the adversary from escalating but instead cause the 
adversary to respond in an escalatory manner. Notably, this omission characterized the earlier 
writings of  Chinese strategists from the 2000 to 2006 period. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISES, BUT NOT ALL CRISES… 
 
Authoritative writings indicate a strong belief  among senior PLA strategists that establishing and 
maintaining effective communications in crisis situations is critical to preventing crises from 
escalating out of  control. Two strategists at China’s National Defense University, for instance, write 
that when a crisis erupts, Chinese officials “must act swiftly” to strengthen communication with the 
other party in order to seek a way to resolve the crisis. Communication through “multiple channels 
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at multiple levels,” including both official and private channels, must be maintained to accurately 
deliver information in a timely manner and to avoid misreading and misjudgment by each party.35  
 
But Chinese strategists make it clear that effective communications is not to be confused with 
complete transparency of intent; instead, they insist upon the importance of maintaining some 
degree of ambiguity in communications with the other party during a crisis. Zhao and Zhao argue 
that the art of communication in crisis situations is “to delicately conceal the relation between our 
intent and the information we try to communicate.” To maintain effective communication, they 
write, “information must be kept transparent to some extent. However, we should not reveal 
everything just for the sake of avoiding misreading.” 
 
That Chinese writings would advance a concept that emphasizes both the imperative of maintaining 
effective communications with the other party in a crisis situation and the importance of seeing that 
Chinese communications are characterized by a certain degree of ambiguity may be at odds with 
textbook views of crisis communications, but they should not come as a shock to Western analysts 
who recognize that crisis communications involve the complex challenge of striking a balance 
between displaying a willingness and flexibility to negotiate with the other party and displaying a 
resolution and willingness to escalate the situation should fundamental principles and interests not 
be respected. Though it does risk the other party misreading the communication, careful use of 
ambiguity in communications is a means of striking that delicate balance.  
 
If Chinese thought about communications in crisis situations concluded with the counsel that such 
communications “should not reveal everything just for the sake of avoiding misreading” then this 
particular author would not find their writings on this subject to be distressing. But it does not end 
there. In a recent study, Iain Johnston observes that it is not clear that Chinese leaders believe the 
principle of establishing and maintaining effective communications even applies in crises concerning 
territorial and sovereignty issues.36 He provides two examples of situations in which China might be 
reluctant to initiate high-level communications with an adversary. In one, an adversary’s actual “first 
shot” over a territory controlled by China would be met with a reluctance on Beijing’s part to initiate 
communication based upon the conclusion that the adversary’s first shot has made it necessary for 
China to resort to force to compel the adversary to back down. In such a situation, Johnston notes, 
China may refuse to initiate discussions with an adversary on the grounds that the adversary “has 
moved the issue from the realm of crisis management to that of escalation dominance.” In 
Johnston’s second example, China declines to initiate high-level communications on the basis that 
the adversary is a not an actual claimant to a disputed territory. In this situation, the refusal to 
communicate with the adversary would serve to “underscore the illegitimacy of their involvement.” 
Even absent the specific examples, the potential that China might well prove reluctant to initiate 
communications in crises involving territorial and sovereignty issues should be of concern to 
Western strategists. Precisely because the plausibility of these not-so-notional examples coming to 
pass is so real, however, Chinese views on this matter should be rendered discomfiting to U.S. 
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strategists and decision makers.37  
 
CRISES AS “WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY” 
 
Like the Chinese authoritative literature published in the 2000-2006 period,38 recent Chinese writings 
continue to reflect an adherence to the belief  that it is important to recognize crises not only as 
situations in which risks “accumulate,” but also as “windows of  opportunity” in which 
“contradictions and issues” might be resolved. On this basis, the 2013 Science of  Military Strategy urges 
commanders to leverage crises to turn the situation to China’s advantage, extolling them to “strive to 
change bad events into good events; to utilize crisis event conditions to grasp the opportunities to 
implement … strategic measures that are difficult to decide to push ahead during peacetime; and to 
enable the entire situation to develop and transform towards a direction favorable to us.”39 Other 
recent authoritative writings echo this view. For instance, writing in China’s prestigious military 
journal China Military Science, NDU analysts Zhao and Zhao argue, “Military crisis control and 
management is based on protecting the fundamental interest of  a nation. Its objective is to strive to 
ensure initiative in crisis management … in addition, effort will be made to turn … crisis into an 
opportunity to further expand national interests.”40 
 
The problem with such counsel is that the quest to gain advantage from a crisis while simultaneously 
seeking resolution to it raises escalatory risks similar to those raised by the attempt to realize the dual 
objectives of  working to prevent a crisis even while preparing for battle in case those efforts fail. In 
addition, as Kaufman and Hartnett note, the position that sees crises as windows of  opportunity 
raises the logical possibility that leaders could intentionally provoke a crisis in a quest to realize a 
strategic objective under the belief  that the crisis could be managed and resolved satisfactorily and 




Writing in 2014 in China Military Science, Wang Xixin, PLA Lieutenant General and Deputy 
Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, described the concept of “war control” as:  
 
… Actions taken under the framework of national political objectives, a variety of 
mandatory and non-mandatory means dominated by the military are chosen flexibly and 
applied … to effectively curb the war, control the war situation, eliminate war chaos and 
safeguard national interests and world peace. More simply, it is to firmly grasp warfare and 
dynamically manage warfare. Its substantive connotation is using the minimum cost to 
                                       
37 It is also worth noting that the comprehensive organizational reforms of the national security apparatus in China to 
include restructuring of the PLA, implemented under Xi Jinping, and targeted at, among other matters, improving the 
efficiency of decision-making and communications in crisis situations will do nothing to overcome a straightforward 
unwillingness to communicate.  
38 See Henley 2006.  
39 SMS 2013, pp. 114-115.  
40 See Zhao Ziyu and Zhao Jingfang, “On Control and Management of Military Crises” (Lun junshi weiji de guankong), 
China Military Science (Zhongguo junshi kexue) 2013, p. 69. 
41 See Kaufman and Hartnett, pp. 51-52.  
 








safeguard national interests … The scope of controlled warfare covers pre-war crisis control, 
operational control during the war and stability control after the war.42 
 
Early in the Science of  Military Strategy, the authors advance an overarching argument summarizing the 
principal reasons why local war must be controlled – reasons that they develop further in the text:  
 
The restrictiveness of  political goals in local wars, the great precision of  
informationized means of  operations, and the highly consumptive nature and 
tremendous destructiveness of  contemporary warfare have determined that military 
confrontational actions and especially acts of  war are restrictive in nature and must 
be controlled.43 
 
Chinese writings emphasize that the control of  war comes down to the issue of  limiting the 
political, economic, and military goals of  war as well as the scope, scale, tempo, and means of  war, 
all while striving to obtain a favorable war outcome at the smallest possible cost.44 Notably, the 
authors of  the most recent edition of  Science of  Military Strategy warn against a “blind expansion” of  
political goals when military operations are succeeding, and “inappropriate recklessness” when “it is 
no longer possible to achieve the fixed military goals.” 
 
There is much about the Chinese conception of  the reasons for controlling war that is compatible 
with Western views. Such compatibility is evident in the PLA’s insistence that military goals must be 
limited because political goals are themselves limited, and as Chinese strategists remind, echoing the 
otherwise Western Clausewitzian view, military goals serve political goals. Thus Chinese military 
commanders are urged to differentiate between political goals and military goals and, recognizing 
that the latter serve the former, “appropriately adjust the military goals when necessary.”45 This 
compatibility extends even to those aspects of  Chinese thinking on war control that raise escalation 
concerns. Two prominent aspects of  Chinese thinking about controlling war itself  raise potential 
escalatory concerns that merit the attention of  Western strategists and decision makers. These are 
the operational principle of  seizing the initiative and the belief  that war can be controlled as if  it 
were a machine awaiting only the calibration of  a skilled engineer bearing the latest in high-
technology tools. It is and should be an ongoing source of  concern for U.S. strategists that, as 
discussed below, Chinese strategists are hardly unique in either their emphasis on seizing the 
initiative or in their view that war is an undertaking subject to the full control of  well-prepared and 
well-equipped military leaders. Indeed, U.S. military doctrine and thinking reflects very similar views.  
 
SEIZING THE INITIATIVE 
 
A recurring theme in Chinese authoritative writings on war control – the more recent writings and 
the earlier writings of  the 2000-2008 period alike – is the importance of  seizing the initiative early in 
a conflict and maintaining the initiative throughout the course of  a conflict.46 A 2010 article co-
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authored by three PLA officers and appearing in the journal China Military Science is representative of  
the Chinese writings covered in the course of  this examination. In advancing “guidelines” for 
controlling war situations in informationized war, the authors emphasize the imperative guideline of  
establishing favorable conditions in the opening of  war by seizing the initiative, with special 
attention paid to the task of  seizing the initiative in the realm of  information dominance. They 
write, “Initiative on the battlefield is the lifeline of  a military; without battlefield initiative, the 
control over war situations will be conducted under extremely difficult conditions, and victory … 
will have no reliable guarantee.”47  
 
 They also emphasize that the PLA must be ready to attack actively and dominate the enemy by 
seizing the earliest moment of  opportunity, arguing that, 
 
The art of  controlling war situations should pay due attention to the use of  offensive 
operations in the initial stage of  operations … making the seizure of  early moments 
of  opportunities to dominate the enemy the focus of  establishing favorable 
conditions in war opening.  
 
The authors of  the Science of  Military Strategy state the imperative more boldly: 
 
Once the preparations are full and there is earnest assurance, we should concentrate 
the crack troops and ferociously attack, to open up the situation within a relatively 
short period of time, to strive to catch the enemy unexpectedly and attack him when 
he is not prepared, to seize and control the battlefield initiative, paralyze and destroy 
the enemy's operational system and shock the enemy's will for war.48 
 
At times Chinese strategists describe seizing the initiative in terms that border on encompassing 
preemptive action. For example, PLA Colonel Zhang Yu, PLA Lieutenant Colonel Liu Sihai, and 
PLA Major Xia Chengxiao write,  
 
Generally speaking, in the initial stage of future wars, there are two kinds of 
opportunities in which our military may seize the early moments to dominate the 
enemy by executing offensive operations. The first is, in the process of enemy 
assembling forces and deploying for attacks, take advantage of the favorable 
opportunity of the enemy's incomplete development of combat capabilities to 
conduct necessary advanced attacks to disrupt the enemy's strategic deployment. The 
other is, when signs of enemy invasion are clear, we may timely organize our regular 
armed forces to boldly conduct cross-border combat operations, directing the 
fighting to the enemy side and inflicting heavy strikes on the enemy. What must be 
pointed out is that, in the initial stage of future wars, our military's seizure of early 
moments of opportunities to dominate the enemy by conducting offensive 
operations cannot be separated from the basic requirements of active defense …  
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Western strategists will be familiar with much of  what is found in the Chinese writings on seizing 
the initiative for the straightforward reason that U.S. military doctrine and thinking reflect very 
similar views. To wit, U.S. joint military doctrine emphasizes the importance of  seizing the initiative 
both across the range of  military operations and at the operational and tactical as well as at the 
strategic levels of  warfare.49 In fact, joint doctrine for operational planning recognizes six phases of  
warfare for which plans must be prepared; as is well known in the U.S. defense community, “Seize 
Initiative” constitutes Phase II of  the construct. Similarly, most Americans who watched much of  
the First Gulf  War and at least the initial phase of  the invasion of  Iraq in 2003 play out on their 
televisions have a sense of  what is connoted in the term “shock and awe” even if  they are not as 
familiar with the more formal concept of  “Rapid Decisive Operations,” which came into 
prominence in the first part of  the last decade before the grinding realities of  the war in Iraq and the 
war in Afghanistan started to whittle away at some of  the more unvarnished claims advanced in its 
name.  
 
In one respect, such points of  similarity between Chinese and Western thinking is not surprising. 
After all, seizing the initiative has long been recognized as an essential principle of  war by strategists 
of war from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz from the Western canon. The problem, however, is that the 
speed and intensity of  operations – and indeed the preparations that precede the operations 
themselves – undertaken to effect this principle work at cross purposes with the central objective of  
limiting the scope, scale, and intensity of  major war between belligerents. This may not be – indeed, 
it has not been – a significant concern in wars between major and lesser states, but when and if  the 
parties to a conflict are both major powers in possession of  advanced conventional weapons 
capabilities and substantial nuclear weapons arsenals, then the concern is significant. In the event of  
conflict between such states – between the United States and China – concepts designed to seize the 
initiative, such as China’s “seize the initiative” or the U.S.’s “Rapid Decisive Operations,” could well 
ignite rapid unwanted escalation. During a crisis, the preparatory efforts that would be necessary to 
seize the initiative could well provoke the initiation of  conflict itself  by signaling imminent 
aggression by one or both parties.50 In crisis and conflict alike, the speed and lethality enabled by the 
advanced technologies of  modern war, the very technologies that are touted as enabling the control 
of  war, could cause one or both actors to act precipitously, if  not preemptively, in an effort to use 
their weapons before they lose them. In short, far from preventing conflict or preventing an 
uncontrolled increase in the intensity of  conflict, the long-standing principle of  seizing the initiative 
could result in the very opposite.  
 
 
WAR CONTROL AS AN ENGINEERING PROBLEM 
 
In their writings about war control, Chinese strategists emphasize that from the initiation of  war 
through the termination of  war, effective war control and the victory that it will bring is largely a 
function of  “meticulous planning based on scientific methods and full preparations,” preparations 
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which they stress are often more important than exploiting tactical and operational combat 
opportunities themselves.51  
 
Of  note is how insistent Chinese strategists are in arguing that war control is a concept not only 
based on scientific methods, but one that can be operationalized with the precision and control of  a 
finely engineered machine. And perhaps this perspective arises from the origins of  the concept of  
war control, or at least from the origins of  the concept as Chinese strategists understand it. As 
Lieutenant General Liu Shenyang explains:  
 
The concept of  war control originates from control theory. It seeks precise control 
and focuses on quality and efficiency. Let us use the concept of  war control as a 
guide to raise our efficiency in command management … We should use the concept 
… to guide weapon development [with a focus on weapons] that can see more 
clearly, respond more quickly, and strike more accurately.52  
 
Without providing any evidence, Chinese strategists assert that the ability to control war has always 
been significant; but now in the 21st century, they claim, the ability for commanders to control war 
has never been stronger. This is so because of  a host of  advanced technology weapons systems 
designed for use in informationized warfare, including most especially advancements in ISR, C2 
capabilities, and precision weapons systems. As three senior PLA officers argue in an article 
appearing in China Military Science, 
 
… the extensive use of high-performance reconnaissance and detection devices 
makes the battlefield more transparent and increases the knowability [sic] of war 
situations; the use of informationized command and control means shortens the 
preparation and implementation time of control of war situations…; [and] the large 
scale use of precision-guided and non-lethal weapons considerably enhances the 
long-range precision strike capability against strategic and campaign targets as well as 
the "soft-kill" capability to disable the enemy from fighting the war, making possible 
the effective control over the scale and intensity of war.53 
 
When reading such encomia to the purported benefits brought to modern warfare by advanced 
technology, Western strategists cannot help but be reminded of  the prevalence in U.S. military 
thought in recent years of  very similar arguments. Some of  the more ardent advocates of  the 
vaunted “Revolution in Military Affairs” or “RMA” – a concept that has continued to enthrall a not 
insignificant percentage of  U.S. analysts and decision makers – aver that technological 
advancements, properly harnessed, will transform the character, if  not the nature, of  war itself. For 
instance, advocates of  network-centric warfare confidently claim that advanced information 
technologies networked throughout the joint battlespace will provide a level of  total information 
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dominance over the enemy so thorough and unambiguous as to eradicate the very fog and friction 
of  war54 – the ambiguity, uncertainty, and chaos recognized since Clausewitz as the prevailing 
characteristic of  war.55  
 
The author has heard the assertion that the Chinese concept “war control” is a rough equivalent to 
the Western concept of  escalation control, or more correctly, escalation management. And, to be 
sure, the Chinese concept of  war control and the Western concept of  escalation management are 
very similar in that they share a fundamental concern with ensuring that the scope, scale, objectives, 
military means, and, finally, the intensity of  war itself  do not outstrip the political goals for which 
the nation has entered into war. But while China’s concept of  war control and the U.S. notion of  an 
RMA appear to subscribe to a shared belief  in the feasibility of  achieving precise control and 
machine-like efficiency in prosecuting war, the Western concept of  escalation management most 
decidedly does not.  
 
Despite the many differences that separated the key architects of  the Western concept of  escalation 
management on the vexing question of  how escalation might be controlled in a competition 
between nuclear-armed rivals, on one thing there would have been no disagreement at all between 
Brodie and Kahn, or Kissinger and Halperin, or Schelling and Osgood. That is, of  course, the 
recognition that what makes escalation control so very challenging is that the objects of  such an 
attempt at control are sentient beings engaged in conflict: humans possessing free will, individuals 
that make choices, and states comprising individuals that make choices. Humans and states at war 
cannot be precisely controlled, nor the means of  war always precisely employed and used in the 
most efficient ways. Their writings on escalation management, in short, reflect a fundamental 
agreement with Clausewitz’s recognition that “the art of war deals with living and with moral forces. 
Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin for 
uncertainty, in the greatest of things as much as in the smallest.”56 
 
Indeed, awareness that war is an inescapably human undertaking that pits intelligent belligerents 
against one another – replete with all of  their psychological and cognitive strengths and 
shortcomings – undergirds the notion that “escalation management,” not “escalation control,” more 
accurately reflects the character of  the task before strategists and decision makers. Escalation 
management connotes the idea that the endeavor is as much an art as it is a science, in fact, probably 
much more than it is a science. It connotes the idea of  imperfect tradeoffs, an acknowledgement 
that inefficiencies will persist, that accidents will happen, and that messages and signals sent by one 
actor in a conflict can and perhaps too frequently will be misinterpreted and inadvertently lead to 
unwanted and unexpected escalatory responses by the other actor.  
 
To proceed on the assumption that war can be precisely controlled, by contrast, is to pretend that 
humans and states at war can be controlled, that their actions can be regimented with the efficiency 
of  a well-calibrated machine. It is to ignore the evidence that the increasing complexity of  the 
technological systems – systems that some U.S. strategists, like their Chinese counterparts, point to 
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as the means for exerting unerring and precision control in war – has been found to be a major 
contributing source of  the accidents and failures that continue to occur even as technology 
advances.57 More to the point, strategists and decision makers will be more likely to assume – despite 
the fog and friction of  war, despite the cognitive distortions that leaders under stress display – that 
their messages and signals will not be misinterpreted, that their actions will be received and 
understood with crystal clarity by their adversary; in short, that should escalation of  a war occur, it 
will not be because of  any action taken by them. In this light, it is not difficult to see how a strong 
belief  in one’s ability to control war could result in a degree of  overconfidence that leads to reckless 
actions in war and reckless actions in undertaking aggression.  
 
ABSENCE OF DISCUSSION OF HOW WARS CAN ESCALATE 
 
Significant for its absence from the recent Chinese writings on escalation is any explicit discussion 
of  the processes or mechanisms of  escalation within war, or as Chinese strategists might have it, a 
treatment of  the processes leading to a loss of  control over a war. This author could find no direct, 
let alone sustained, discussion in the Science of  Military Strategy or other recent authoritative writings 
of  accidental or inadvertent escalation. In this respect, the recent Chinese writings on escalation are 
precisely like the earlier writings on escalation from the 2000-2006 period. As Chinese strategists 
would have it, or at least as the authors of  the Science of  Military Strategy would leave its readers to 
conclude, local war under informationized conditions is controllable war, war whose military 
intensity, scale, and scope is fully controllable, in large part precisely because of  the advanced 
capabilities that make for “informationized conditions.” While the possibility of  accidents in crisis 
and war conditions is acknowledged, Chinese strategists seem to believe that what happens in a local 
war under informationized conditions is a reflection of  the deliberate choices and actions of  the 
belligerents. Thus, on this matter, the earlier verdict of  the 2008 RAND study by Morgan et al. still 
stands.  
 
SPACE AND CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 
 
In the 2013 version of  the Science of  Military Strategy, Chinese strategists characterize space and 
cyberspace as independent domains critical to modern warfare, and in doing so, as Kevin Pollpeter 
and Jonathan Ray point out, the authors provided a level of  strategic prominence for both domains 
absent from the 2001 version of  the document.58 The more recent version goes to proclaim that 
“Space has become a strategic elevation point, and space-based assisting-support and support 
systems are an indispensable strategic brace-support in winning informationized wars.”59 For its part 
the 2015 Defense White Paper adds, “Outer space has become a commanding height in international 
strategic competition … Cyberspace has become a new pillar of  economic and social development, 
and a new domain of  national security.”60 The logic is straightforward. As stated in November 2009 
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by then People’s Liberation Army Air Force Commander and now Vice Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission General Xu Qiliang, control of this new commanding height means having 
control of the air and space, which in turn, “means having control of the ground, oceans, and the 
electromagnetic space, which also means having the strategic initiative in one’s hands.”61 The authors 
of the Science of Military Strategy put it more economically, asserting that space and network space are 
“the crux to obtaining comprehensive dominance rights on the battlefield to further conquer the 
enemy and gain victory” or, more simply still, “new fields for seizing the battlefield initiative.”62  
 
Chinese strategists believe that future wars will likely begin with “attack-defense confrontations” in 
space and “network space” – the English translation of  the term most often used by Chinese writers 
rather than cyberspace.  
 
While Chinese strategists assert that in the space domain, China still follows the principle of  not 
attacking unless attacked,63 they do not foreclose the option of  conducting offensive space 
operations. Indeed, the Science of  Military Strategy openly embraces it, noting:  
 
Space military systems … are certain to be key point targets of  the opposing sides’ 
attack and defense confrontation. In order to effectively contain the hostile space 
activity of  other nations, and prevent friendly space systems from suffering attack … 
[we] also must … develop certain space offensive means and capability, and when 
necessary reveal the capability to cause substantive sabotage of  and adversely 
influence the adversary’s space systems, as well as reveal the firm resolve to dare to 
and prepare to use this capability, thus creating certain psychological pressure on and 
fear in the adversary, and forcing the adversary to dare not conduct space operations 
… When necessary, [we] even can conduct limited space operational activities with 
warning and punishment as goals to stop the adversary from willfully escalating the 
intensity of  a space confrontation.64  
 
But the authors go much further. Recognizing enemy networks as force multipliers, Chinese 
strategists urge the PLA to leverage,  
 
…the characteristic of  networks as easy to attack but difficult to defend [and consequently] 
to not only sabotage the enemy's software systems, but also destroy the enemy's hardware 
facilities equipment … especially emphasiz[ing] sabotage of  the enemy ground support and 
signal communication systems, and severing of  contacts between enemy space [forces] and 
the earth's surface, so that the enemy cannot control and exploit space systems.65  
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Building on a gray zone approach not terribly dissimilar from Chinese practice in the South China 
Sea, the authors of  the Science of  Military Strategy urge the military and civilian sectors, in preparing 
for and implementing cyber activities, “to integrate” so that the civilian network sector “screens the 
military in peacetime,” and executes “military-civilian joint integrated attacks in wartime.”66 
 
Recent Chinese writings reflect a thorough awareness of  space and cyberspace as being offense 
dominant domains, an awareness that serves to underwrite repeated call for preparations to take 
early offensive action. The writings reflect the belief  that offensive cyberspace and counter-space 
operations are not only advisable early in a conflict with a major adversary, but that such operations 
can be undertaken at a comparatively low risk of  escalation. And as regards the benefits of  action, 
Chinese strategists paint a vision of  the power of  offensive cyberspace operations that is 
breathtaking in its claims. To wit:  
 
One successful [round of] network warfare can cause collapse of  the adversary's 
economy, and paralysis of  his operational systems. Within future war, the side 
holding the superior position in computer network operations will seize the initiative 
in war and generate powerful psychological awe in the enemy. Network warfare 
serves as a new type of  strategic deterrent means.67 
 
On the other hand, Chinese writings reflect a sophisticated understanding of  the deterrence 
challenges in the cyber realm:  
 
Network deterrent effects are difficult to accurately evaluate … [T]he concealed 
quality and element of  surprise in network attack are very strong; people find it very 
difficult via adjustments to and changes in hostile network activities to assess the 
changes in the adversary's decision-making and intent. The non-occurrence of  large-
scale network attack actions is not equivalent to the absence of  network attacks … 
very likely this is because the hostile network attacks cannot penetrate functionally 
powerful network defense systems, and is not necessarily because the adversary has 
been deterred and thus forced to abandon or alter his intention to execute network 
attacks.68  
 
But they nevertheless urge commanders to be unafraid “to use military deterrence methods, 
particularly in space, network and other new domains of  struggle, to smash the enemy’s warfighting 
command systems.”69  
 
On balance, however, there appears to be a healthy recognition in recent Chinese writing that not 
only is cyber deterrence a distinctly different activity than traditional nuclear and conventional 
deterrence, but that the theory and practice of  cyber deterrence remain objects for additional 
research and development:  
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Compared to traditional deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, network 
deterrence exhibits distinct differences in respect to the objects of  deterrence, the 
deterrence objectives, and the avenues of  deterrence. Although deterrence is 
important content of  military struggle in the network domain, there is nonetheless 
very great diversity in the various understanding of  network deterrence, and both the 
theory and practice of  network deterrence await further development and 
perfection.70 
 
Chinese strategists do not appear to have yet grappled with the possibility that operational concepts 
and activities now being urged and considered in the realms of  space and cyberspace could 
inadvertently lead to escalation of  a crisis or conflict. In fact, the subject of  inadvertent escalation 
does not, once again, even appear to come up. It is unlikely that they have simply overlooked such 
issues. Instead, it is more likely that the absence of  such a discussion is deliberate. In this respect, 
David Gompert and Phillip Saunders offer the compelling argument that the Chinese habit of  
neglecting to address the escalatory implications of  the military operations they urge the PLA to 
prepare for in space and cyberspace stems, in part, from a reluctance to relieve American fears of  
conflict in those two domains – just as the American reluctance to acknowledge that the strategic 
nuclear relationship between the U.S. and China is now one of  mutual vulnerability stems, in part, 
from an American hesitancy to relieve Chinese fears of  nuclear escalation, which, if  relieved, would 




From the foregoing, it should be clear that Chinese strategists hold a broad perspective of  
deterrence and thus recognize multiple modes of  and roles for deterrence: conventional deterrence, 
space and cyberspace deterrence, and nuclear deterrence.72 In fact, PLA writings make it clear that 
China’s deterrence encompasses not just military capabilities, but also diplomatic, economic, and 
scientific and technological strength. However, this section of  the examination focuses on how 
Chinese strategists conceive of  escalation within the context of  nuclear deterrence.73 More 
specifically, given the breadth of  the subject of  deterrence, the author confines the discussion to an 
examination of  those aspects of  recent Chinese thinking74 on nuclear deterrence that raise notable 
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escalation issues and concerns, whether they are of  recent vintage or are carried forward from the 
earlier authoritative literature. 
 
The main aspects of  the Chinese conception of  deterrence (and here, the conception does cover 
deterrence in all its modes) have not evolved over the past 16 years and should appear familiar 
enough to Western strategists as to raise no concerns.75 To wit, Chinese strategists see deterrence as 
a continuation of  and subordinate to politics. The fundamental goal of  deterrence “is to stop an 
opponent's certain behavior from endangering ourselves” by making “the opponent believe that the 
cost of  his activity will exceed the benefit he might gain, and therefore, change his strategic 
judgment,” and its “role” is to “transmit the danger, urgency, and reality of  possible violence.” 
Deterrence is characterized as “a military notion, and also a psychological-political notion” that 
entails the “application of  comprehensive strengths,” whose effectiveness depends upon three 
essential factors: capability, resolution, and communication.  
 
Regarding nuclear deterrence more specifically, the 2012 version of the China Strategic Missile Force 
Encyclopedia offers that “Nuclear deterrence is generally divided into nuclear deterrence in peacetime, 
nuclear deterrence under crisis conditions, and nuclear deterrence in conventional warfare.” In 
peacetime, the goal of nuclear deterrence is to “safeguard national interests and enhance the national 
status and to prevent potential nuclear threats from escalating.” Under crisis conditions, the goal of 
nuclear deterrence is “to prevent nuclear crises from escalating and to prevent nuclear threats from 
escalating into a real nuclear war.” And, in conventional warfare, the goal of nuclear deterrence is 
“to prevent a conventional war from escalating into a real nuclear war and to suppress a limited 
nuclear war … from escalating into a full-scale nuclear war.”76 These goals have also remained 
consistent over the past 16 years and are consistent with China’s publicly articulated policy and 
strategy for nuclear weapons, although they are cast at a different level.77  
INEXORABLE MOMENTUM 
 
One persistent aspect of  the Chinese understanding of  deterrence that continues to raise escalation 
concerns is the notion of  “inexorable momentum” that is associated with the PLA’s concept of  
deterrence signaling. According to this notion, credibly signaling China’s willingness and intent 
through a series of  increasingly escalatory methods is essential to creating a perception on the part 
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of  the adversary that, unless it backs down, the inexorable momentum reflected in China’s actions 
point to an undeniable willingness to use decisive force. Johnston draws attention to NDU’s 2015 
version of  the Science of  Strategy that lists eight methods of  signaling designed to create such a sense 
of  inexorable momentum and thus to deter the adversary.78 With the exception of  conducting 
attacks on the adversary’s information systems, the list of  deterrence signaling methods in the 2015 
NDU text is very similar to lists advanced to support the same notion of  inexorable momentum in 
earlier authoritative texts such as the 2001 version of  the Science of  Military Strategy and the once 
secret Science of  Second Artillery Campaigns, published in 2004.79 The persistent problem that 
characterizes both the older and the more recent Chinese treatments is that texts contain no 
acknowledgement that the suggested deterrent signaling actions, which include such provocative 
actions as conducting launch exercises, run the real risk, not of  causing the adversary to back down, 
but rather of  just the opposite, of  provoking the adversary to escalate in the certainty that China is 
already committed to decisive military action. This is but another example of  disquieting silence that 
continues to characterize Chinese writings on escalation. 
 
MOVING TO A LAUNCH-ON-WARNING POSTURE? 
 
China’s more recent writings on deterrence raise a second and new concern regarding China’s 
thinking about escalation. Specifically, the most recent edition of  the Science of  Military Strategy 
includes a short passage that has generated attention and concern among U.S. deterrence and non-
proliferation specialists80 as well as U.S. Sinologists who specialize in Chinese military issues81 as it 
unmistakably reveals that Chinese strategists are already formally discussing the possibility of  China 
moving to an embrace of  a launch-on-warning nuclear posture for its nuclear missile force. The 
passage suggests that some unknown number of  Chinese strategists, to include the authors of  that 
text, believe that the adoption of  a launch-on-warning nuclear posture would possess the virtue of  
enhancing deterrence even as it maintained consistency with China’s nuclear no-first-use policy. The 
passage in question reads:  
 
When conditions are met, and when necessary, one can rapidly launch a nuclear 
missile counterstrike when it has been clearly determined that the enemy has already 
launched nuclear missiles against us but said enemy nuclear warheads have yet to 
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arrive at their targets and effectively explode or cause actual damage to us. This both 
conforms to our country’s consistent policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and 
also effectively prevents our nuclear forces from suffering greater losses, improving 
the survivability of nuclear missile forces and their counterstrike capabilities.82 
 
The adoption of  a launch-on-warning nuclear posture would constitute a fundamental departure for 
China’s nuclear strategy as it would require the mating of  warheads and missiles – thus breaking with 
China’s long-standing practice of  storing nuclear warheads separate from their delivery vehicles – as 
well as the development of  a strategic early warning system. Gregory Kulacki, a Sinologist with the 
Union of  Concerned Scientists, warns that should China “decide to increase readiness to launch 
rapidly by mating warheads to missiles during normal peacetime operations, that would, in 
combination with procedures to launch on warning, significantly increase the risk of an accidental or 
erroneous launch of a Chinese nuclear weapon.”83 But again, as with the concept of  creating 
inexorable momentum that also comes up in discussions of  deterrence, Chinese strategists are 
disturbingly silent regarding any of the risks, including the escalation risks, that could be associated 
with the adoption of a launch-on-warning posture.  
 
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
 
This examination has discerned a number of  notable characteristics of  current Chinese thought on 
escalation.  
 
The most recent version of  the Science of  Military Strategy’s treatment of  limited war, to include in 
particular the discussion of  limited war’s origins in the Cold War; the discussion of  the necessity of  
limiting the political, military, and economic goals of  local war; and the injunction to limit the scale 
and scope of  force in local war is all quite similar to the Western conception of  the imperatives of  
limited war and is, to that extent, and for this author, encouraging.  
 
Crisis control and war control clearly emerge as subjects of  major importance for the Chinese 
military. More appears to be written about them today than in the 2000-2006 period. Chinese 
strategists appear to believe adamantly that crises and wars must be controlled lest they escalate. This 
concern appears to stem not from the existential worry that animates most Western strategists, 
however, but instead from the much more pragmatic and utilitarian concern that an uncontrolled 
local war could derail China from achieving its national economic development objectives. 
 
This argument would seem to hold important implications for U.S. strategy and planning. In 
particular, it would seem to lend greater weight to the arguments advanced by advocates of  offshore 
control concepts, which maintain that holding China’s energy lifelines at risk is a less risky and more 
effective operational approach than numerous mainland strikes entailed in operational concepts like 
Air-Sea Battle. One of  the principal criticisms of  offshore control concepts is that they would prove 
ineffective in compelling China to stop its aggression, as they would take too long to exact 
significant costs on China. But if  in fact Beijing’s key concern is to stay on course to keep its 
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economy humming and the CCP in power, then perhaps a better way to respond to Chinese military 
aggression is not to confront them at the same game they have started but to respond in an indirect 
way that effectively lets China know that their national economic development objectives are now 
going to be significantly derailed, that this is going to occur without dropping even one bomb on 
Chinese soil, and that the lifeblood of  their economy will continue to be withheld every day, every 
week, and every month until China’s aggression ceases.84  
 
Chinese military writings reflect an enduring belief  that war can be controlled if  only the correct 
processes and principles are followed. This belief  has been strengthened by the belief  that 
advancements in ISR capabilities, C2 capabilities, and in precision weapons provide commanders 
with an even greater ability to control war at the operational and tactical levels. But the Chinese 
belief  that war can be controlled with precision, as if  conflict between humans at war was 
tantamount to calibrating the parts in a machine, is a belief  that negates the human experience. If  
taken too much to heart, it is a belief  that can lead even intelligent strategists to the conceit that 
strategists need not entertain the possibility that their actions and signals might be misinterpreted 
and lead inadvertently to unwanted escalation.  
 
Chinese strategists continue to write about the necessity of  controlling crises and wars lest they 
escalate, but they do so without ever discussing the different mechanisms by which crises and 
conflicts escalate; in particular, no distinctions are drawn between escalation mechanisms that are 
deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental in nature.  
 
More specifically, Chinese authoritative writings continue to provide no discussion of  the potential 
escalation risks arising from Chinese military principles, doctrines, and concepts advanced as critical 
to crisis and war control. These would include the emphasis placed upon the principle of  seizing the 
initiative, a belief  that crises should be seen and exploited as windows of  opportunity, and an 
apparent unwillingness to initiate and maintain communications with an adversary in crises involving 
territorial and sovereignty issues – ironically, the very crises in which early and effective 
communications would be most imperative. Seeking to gain advantage from a crisis while 
simultaneously seeking resolution to it raises the possibility that leaders could deliberately provoke a 
crisis in a quest to realize a strategic objective under the belief  that the crisis could be managed and 
resolved satisfactorily and the strategic objective gained. 
 
Similar to PLA texts from the 2000-2006 period, more recent Chinese writings on military crises 
neglect to examine the challenges inherent in simultaneously meeting the dual objectives of  
preventing a crisis from escalating into war and preparing the battlefield should war erupt, how these 
objectives could compete with one another, and the likelihood that activities to prepare the 
battlefield for war could either cause the adversary to respond in an escalatory manner or create the 
conditions for an accident possibly resulting in an escalation that neither side wants.  
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Moreover, Chinese strategists do not discuss the importance of  thresholds and red lines in war, nor 
do they examine the types of  actions and triggers that would constitute the crossing of  them. And 
notably, they are silent about the possibility that an adversary might see Chinese actions as having 
crossed key thresholds or red lines.85 In this respect, again, the recent writings continue a pattern 
established, with two important exceptions, in earlier writings. One of  the exceptions from the 
earlier writings is the Science of  Second Artillery Campaigns, a secret 2004 PLA textbook that has since 
found its way into circulation in the West, which lists four specific wartime situations in which the 
PLA would approach CCP leadership to request that China reduce its nuclear threshold. The four 
situations are:  
 
First, when an enemy threatens to carry out conventional strikes against our nuclear 
facilities … Second, when an enemy threatens to carry out strikes against our major 
strategic targets related to the safety of  the people, like large-scale water and 
electricity stations … Third, when an enemy threatens to carry out medium or high 
strength conventional strikes against our capital, important major cities, and other 
political and economic centers … Fourth, when conventional warfare continues to 
escalate and the overall strategic situation changes from positive to disadvantageous 
for us, and when national safety is seriously threatened …86 
 
The debate that briefly occurred among Chinese strategists in the 2008 to 2010 timeframe over the 
issue of  whether China should revisit its “no first use” policy was the context for the second 
exception. In the course of  that debate, as Michael Chase points out, some Chinese strategists 
suggested that because conventional attacks can in certain cases have effects as devastating as 
nuclear attacks, there is some ambiguity in determining what constitutes first use by an adversary. 
Publicly reflecting an aspect of  the treatment in the Science of  Second Artillery Campaigns, Chinese 
strategists specifically offered the example of  a conventional attack on a country’s nuclear forces, 
which, they argued, could be seen as breaking the nuclear threshold, resulting in the country 
suffering the attack finding it difficult to refrain from a nuclear counterattack.87  
 
It is possible that the absence of  an examination of  specific thresholds and red lines is intentional, a 
lacuna explicable as reflecting a concern over revealing too much and thus opening up a 
vulnerability. Chinese strategist could also be concerned over the possibility of  providing a level of  
specificity that could generate unwanted controversy and attention, as the Science of  Second Artillery 
Campaigns seems to have done. 88  
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Recent Chinese writings reflect the belief  that offensive cyberspace and counter-space operations are 
not only advisable early in a conflict with a major adversary, but that they can be undertaken at a 
comparatively low risk of  escalation. They also reflect a similar belief  that in both crisis and war 
offensive cyber operations can be carried out against civilian and military targets without causing the 
adversary to escalate. Both are very high-risk beliefs on the part of  Chinese strategists. Thus it 
appears Chinese strategists have laid the groundwork for extending the concept of  seizing the 
initiative into the realms of  space and cyberspace warfare. Indeed, as Chinese texts make clear, 
Chinese analysts are even contemplating cyber attacks against civilian targets during crises as means 
to signal Chinese resolve and capability. Again, Chinese strategists seem not to have sufficiently 
thought through the escalatory consequences that such operations might have.  
 
In the area of  nuclear deterrence, the continued failure of  Chinese strategists to recognize that the 
deterrent signaling actions called for by their concept of  inexorable momentum could result in an 
adversary response precisely the opposite of  what the concept promises. Finally, while Chinese 
strategists appear to have accounted for the benefits to be gained from China’s potential adoption of  
a launch-on-warning policy, they appear to have overlooked the escalatory risks that such a policy 
change could raise.   
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RESPONSE TO A RECURRING METHODOLOGICAL OBJECTION 
 
In prior presentations of  the arguments presented in this examination, the author has encountered 
the objection that the focus on Chinese strategic and doctrinal writings is overly narrow and that a 
richer and more compelling, if  not more accurate, understanding of  Chinese thought about 
escalation can only be gained through an integrated assessment that accounts not only for Chinese 
military writings but also for trends and investments in Chinese military capabilities and operational 
concepts and for actual Chinese behavior in past crisis and conflict situations through an 
examination of  case studies.  
 
The author will be the first to agree that an appreciation of  Chinese military capabilities and 
operational concepts is a necessary, though still insufficient, condition for understanding the options 
Chinese leaders have available to them in crises and conflicts. Indeed, while intriguing and 
sometimes helpful in shedding light on how a nation’s armed forces might approach different crises 
and conflicts, strategic thought and doctrine are in the end hollow absent the capabilities and 
operational concepts to execute them. Fortunately, on this issue, analysts now have at their disposal 
a significant and ever-growing body of rigorous examinations of the evolution and growth of 
Chinese military capabilities over the past twenty years – capabilities that provide PLA leaders the 
ability to implement many if not all of the concepts and doctrinal practices articulated in their 
strategic writings.89 The author assumes the reader’s close acquaintance with such treatments.  
 
As regards the utility of case studies of past Chinese behavior in crises and conflicts as a source of 
illumination for what the Chinese might actually do in future crises and conflicts, the author might 
dispense with the objection over their absence on the practical grounds that a treatment of case 
studies would both go beyond the scope of the task given him and exceed the space limitations 
afforded the resulting paper, both of which happen to have the virtue of being true. A more 
substantive response, however, is that the author believes that the set of crises and conflict that exist 
in the PRC’s 67-year history are so limited in number and so distant in time and circumstance as to 
render their utility in illuminating, let alone forecasting, future Chinese behavior extremely suspect. 90 
And this from an analyst who is intellectually predisposed and indeed persuaded that looking back is 
almost always a necessary condition for attempting to see more clearly what may well lay ahead.  
 
The problem, in brief, is that the China that the United States confronted in the crises over Taiwan 
in 1995-1996, the China that responded so viscerally to the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade, and the China that the United States confronted in the tense months 
following the April 2001 collision between U.S. and Chinese military aircraft off the coast of Hainan 
                                       
89 For a recent example, see Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power 1996-2017, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015.  
90 The author is, of course, aware of the excellent comparative case study work that has been conducted on Chinese 
crises and Sino-American crises in particular. For perhaps the foremost among these, see Michael D. Swaine and Zhange 
Tuosheng with Danielle F.S. Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006.  
 








is simply not the China that exists in 2016 – not in military capabilities, not in economic strength, 
not in leadership, and not in terms of military strategy and doctrine.91  
 
What is true regarding our suspect ability to anticipate future Chinese behavior in crises from their 
past behavior in crises is just as true, if not more so, regarding the fool’s errand of attempting to 
anticipate China’s behavior in a future conflict from its behavior in past conflicts. Indeed, that China’s 
only direct and overt armed conflict with a nuclear weapons state – the 1969 border conflict with the 
Soviet Union – came at a time when China possessed a small, vulnerable nuclear arsenal renders that 
case of doubtful utility in anticipating future Chinese behavior. That China’s last direct involvement 
in an armed conflict was its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, long before China undertook its substantial 
and still on-going military modernization efforts, is alone enough to render a case study of that 
conflict even less useful. Had China possessed conventional military capabilities and forces 
comparable in quality to those of either the Soviet Union or Vietnam in the time periods of those 
conflicts, then those past conflicts would have greater similarity, at least in the conventional realm, 
to the roughly symmetrical regional military balance that today obtains the United States and China 
in the Asian Pacific. But, of course, except in terms of the sheer numbers of bodies that China could 
bring to bear in a war, Chinese conventional capabilities and forces were significantly outclassed by 
those of the Soviet Union and Vietnam at the time of each of those conflicts. Indeed, the impressive 
scope, scale, and technological sophistication of today’s PLA in terms of both conventional and 
nuclear capabilities alike have all been put in place not since China’s conflict with Vietnam, not even 
since its confrontations with the United States in 1995 and 1996 over Taiwan, but, by and large, 
since 1999, when China witnessed for a second time in the same decade the stunning speed and 
effectiveness of the U.S. military in dispatching autocratic adversaries bearing otherwise significantly 
sized and equipped militaries. And yet, for Beijing, it was the accidental bombing of China’s 
Embassy in Belgrade, which senior-most officials of China believed to be anything but an accident, 
that served as the most critical turning point in spurring new and unprecedented levels of 
investments in China’s military modernization.92 It is for these reasons that the author believes that 
examination of case studies of Chinese behavior in actual crises and conflicts that now lie well in the 
                                       
91 Importantly, the 2006 Swaine and Tuosheng edited volume of case studies is comprised of papers initially developed 
for a 2004 conference on crisis management in Beijing; see p. xii. Thus the crises referenced in the author’s sentence and 
the case studies of those same crises appearing in the volume were separated by a mere 3-9 years. In short, the degree of 
change China had experienced in the time separating the crises that were the focus of the case studies and the actual 
publication of the volume was in many instances negligible. But in the decade that has passed since the volume appeared 
and in the 15 years that have elapsed since the case study of the latest crisis, China has changed immensely in each of the 
four categories referenced.  
92 The performance of U.S. military forces in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and the 1995-96 crises over Taiwan were 
wake-up calls for China’s leadership. Lessons learned from the former caused the Central Military Commission of the 
CCP to take the unusual step of issuing a major revision to the military strategic guidelines that serve as the basis for 
China’s national military strategy, while the crises over Taiwan coming just a few years later resulted in an actual and 
substantial increase in the PLA’s budget. But as Western analysts have come to learn over just the past few years, it was, 
in fact, the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 that served as a fundamental turning 
point that, as Chase notes, “motivated Beijing to devote even greater resources to improving the capabilities of the PLA 
by focusing on asymmetric approaches to exploiting potential U.S. military vulnerabilities and developing advanced, 
high-technology weapons to deter—or, if necessary, counter—U.S. military intervention in any conflict involving 
China.” See Chase & Chan 2016 TWQ, p. 117. On the role and importance of the military strategic guidelines in China’s 
national military strategy see M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informationized Local Wars’,” 
China Brief, Volume: 15, Issue: 13, Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, July 2, 2015, accessed on July 7, 2016 at 
http://www.jamestown.org. 








past would fail to yield any insights capable of explaining, let alone anticipating current or future 
Chinese military thinking about escalation and its management.93 
 
                                       
93 To be clear, this does not mean that other important insights and lessons about current and future challenges 
associated with crises and conflicts cannot be derived from case studies of past crises and conflicts in general, let alone 
from the specific examples referenced. Indeed, Gerson, for example, derives a number of important lessons and 
implications for future nuclear challenges in his excellent case study of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict. But, being 
the careful analyst that he is, Gerson makes it abundantly clear that the insights and lessons he derives are pertinent to 
future confrontations “between states with vastly asymmetric nuclear (and conventional) capabilities …,” which of 
course is to say pertinent to situations in which the relationship between the actors is similar in terms of relative military 
capabilities, experience as nuclear states, strategic cultures, and views on deterrence as the situation that obtained 
between China and the Soviet Union in 1969. See Michael S. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, 
and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010, pp. 53-59.  
 
